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WORKING PAPERS

No. 2

Youth migration and development in the Danube region. Processes, perceptions and policy frameworks

Tamás KISS

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ROMANIAN INSTITUTE FOR RESEARCH ON NATIONAL MINORITIES

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This working paper was developed in the framework of the project YOUMIG - Improving institutional capacities and fostering cooperation to tackle the impacts of transnational youth migration.

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Contents

The published quotations in this study represent the individual opinion of the persons interviewed, and do not represent the approaches and attitudes of the partners involved in the project.

1. Introduction

Our study provides a comparative-historical analysis of developmental, demographic and migratory processes in the Danube region, relying on empirical research carried out in 7 municipalities, namely Bratislava-Rača (Slovakia), Burgas (Bulgaria), Graz (Austria), Kanijža (Serbia), Maribor (Slovenia), Sfântu-Gheorghe (Romania) and Szeged (Hungary).Following 1990,dramatic changes have taken place in the region and this is particularly true in case of former Eastern Bloc countries which have become low fertility emigration countries. When we focus on migratory processes we try to show the interplay between structural processes and cognitive frameworks and to connect global, national and local contexts.

The main focus of our inquiry is on the complex relation between development and migration and the concept of developmental hierarchies plays a crucial role throughout the paper. First, we present the major demographic and migratory trends the investigated municipalities should face and we argue that they cannot be interpreted without taking into account the position of the investigated municipalities in the developmental hierarchies. Second, we turn toward cognitive aspects and try to map perceptions and interpretative frameworks of local stakeholders concerning migration and development.

Except Kanjiža in Serbia, all the investigated municipalities belong to the European Union, which, as a whole, is one of the receiving areas of global migratory flows. Nevertheless, the investigated countries and municipalities have experienced quite different demographic and migratory trends during the last three decades. We focus on these differences caused primarily by intra-regional and intra-EU migration (or mobility) which takes place in a hierarchized transnational space. [1]

[1] See Melegh et al. (2010); Melegh (2012); Melegh et al. (2016); Kiss (2017) for empirical research on perceived transnational developmental hierarchies.

Figure 1

Map of the YOUMIG partnership in the Danube area

Danube Region (defined by the Interreg Danube Programme)
YOUMIG countries/regions
YOUMIG, cities of academic and statistical partners
YOUMIG, local municipalities

Cartography: Ádám Németh

YOUMIG at a glance

Full name: YOUMIG - Improving institutional capacities and fostering cooperation to tackle the impacts of transnational youth migration
A project of the **Danube Transnational Programme**
Start date: 01-01-2017
End date: 30-06-2019
Budget: 2,718,853 EUR (ERDF Contribution: 2,055,179 EUR, IPA Contribution: 255,846 EUR)
Call number: Call 1
Priority: 4. (Well-governed Danube region)
Specific objective: 4.1. (Improve institutional capacities to tackle major societal challenges)

Project partners:
Lead partner: Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HU)
Work package leaders: University of Vienna (AT), Leibniz Institute for East and Southeast European Studies (DE), Maribor Development Agency (SI), INFOSTAT - Institute of Informatics and Statistics (SK)
ERDF partners: Municipality of Szeged (HU), City of Graz (AT), Institute for Economic Research (SI), Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities (RO), Municipality of Sfântu Gheorghe (RO), National Statistical Institute of the Republic of Bulgaria (BG), Burgas Municipality (BG), Municipality of the City district of Bratislava- Ra a (SK)
IPA partners: Statistical Office of the Republic of Serbia (RS), Institute of Social Sciences (RS), Municipality of Kanjiža (RS)
Associated Strategic Partners: Statistics Austria (AT), City of Karlsruhe (DE), Federal Institute for Population Research (DE)

YOUMIG, in which 19 partners from 8 countries work together, wishes to support local governments in using the developmental potential of youth migration, which will lead to a better-governed and more competitive Danube region. The project aims at boosting their institutional capacities to enhance the scarce local evidence of youth migration and contributing to improved policymaking with a focus on human capital. Statistical offices and academic organizations team up with local governments in a complex and customized multi-level and transnational cooperation to create local developmental strategies based on improved impact indicators of youth migration and to introduce transnationally tested tools for managing local challenges. As a result, institutions and stakeholders obtain increased capacities through an intensified cooperation.

YOUMIG's work is structured in six work packages (WPs). Aside from management (WP1) and communication (WP2) issues, the thematic work is distributed as follows. In line with the present document, the Conceptual Framework, all partners contribute to the development of improved evidence of youth migration and its developmental impacts on the EU, national and local level by elaborating local status quo analyses for the local partners (WP3). Through a comprehensive evaluation of the locally available indicators of youth migration, the project identifies the shortfalls of measuring local challenges and elaborates and tests new or improved indicators of youth migration (WP4). On the local level, the project improves capacities to manage related processes by jointly testing and introducing good practices and institutional units, tailored to local needs (WP5). The project concludes in transnationally tested tools for all governance levels contributing to better strategies, policies and services related to the issue of youth migration (WP6).

YOUMIG's outputs are uploaded to
http://www.interreg-danube.eu/youmig/outputs

1.1. The structure of the synthetic report

This working paper aims to synthetize the findings of local level investigations carried out in the municipalities mentioned above. Not counting the introduction and the summary, our report has five parts.

First (in part 2), we outline a typology of different positions in the socio-spatial hierarchy inside the Danube region. As mentioned already, we perceive (both internal and international) migration as flows between places with different position in a socio-spatial hierarchy. Socio-spatial hierarchies are obviously social constructs and, consequently they do not exit (and cannot be analyzed) independently from subjective perceptions. One of the aims of this paper is to present how different actors, most importantly local stakeholders and young people involved in migratory movement, perceive developmental positions and prospects of their municipality. However, before presenting these empirical results, we will outline how developmental positions and migratory movements differ along "objective" statistical indicators. Part 2 also presents migratory processes at national level. The region is characterized by rather low levels of fertility, well below the level needed for simple reproduction. Some of the post-Communist countries have experienced a crisis of mortality, and consequently life expectancy at birth (an in certain ages) could be considered low in comparison with Western European or Northern American countries. Nevertheless, in a broader (global) regional or historical perspective life expectancies in the Danube region are rather high and, combined with low fertility, this is conductive to population ageing. Natural decrease also characterizes the region. In spite of these common characteristics, however, countries, regions and municipalities experience dramatically different population trends. In some areas there is a relatively dynamic population growth, while others face population decline. Obviously, migration makes the differences. Receiving areas experience growth and relative demographic dynamism, while sending areas might even face depopulation.

Second (in part 3), we describe developmental positions and migratory processes at local level. We take into account country level developmental positions but we also emphasize that the investigated municipalities differ in their positions in internal developmental hierarchy. Consequently one cannot forget that we compare settlements with quite different developmental pathway and prospects.

Third (in part 4), we return developmental hierarchies, however, now at the level of perceptions. Here we rely on qualitative investigation (interviews) and present how local stakeholders perceive the developmental prospects of their municipality. In this part our aim is to reconstruct general discourses or paradigms of social development, in the form they appear in the interviews conducted with local stakeholders. Social development is an important topic in social sciences too and different schools of thinking exist in this respect. In this part of the working paper we are "agnostic" concerning different arguments and currents of developmental thinking, we ask how our interviewees perceive development and think about development.

Forth (in part 5), we continue the same line of investigation and try to outline the frameworks in which the interviewed stakeholders think about and deal with migration. As it will be shown, developmental framework is quite important in thinking about migration. Consequently, one of our aims is to map how stakeholders perceive the "migration-development nexus". Nevertheless developmental thinking is not the sole framework in which stakeholders interpret migratory processes. The second section of part 5 deals with populationist concerns and demographic nationalism, which cannot be avoided when discussing the interpretative frameworks of migration.

Fifth (in part 6), we map the self-representations of young migrants. In this part we present some results of the narrative biographic interviews conducted in each of the investigated municipalities. In this paper we do not exhaust all these analytical possibilities but we construct a typology of migrant narratives on the one hand and discuss the relations between the self-representations of young migrants and interpretative frameworks of the stakeholders on the other.

1.2. Local Status Quo Analyses in 7 municipalities: methodological remarks

Our comparative inquiry is based on local level empirical research and on the so called *Local Status Quo Analyses* (LSQAs) carried out by thematic experts commissioned/entrusted by the seven local partners involved in the YOUMIG project (see Annex 1). Our researchers combined qualitative and quantitative methods and relied on a common methodology (guides and grids for interviews and focus groups and common template for the LSQAs) provided by the Romanian Institute for Research on National Minorities.

Through combining quantitative and qualitative methods we aimed to obtain an integrated analysis of migratory, demographic and developmental processes. Besides describing the processes, trends and effects of youth migration we aimed at systematically mapping the perspectives and interpretative frameworks of different actors, namely local stakeholders and institutional actors in charge with policies concerned with youth migration on the one hand and youngsters involved in different types of migratory processes on the other. In our view, perceptions and interpretative frameworks (as ideational factors) shape both policies and individual strategies and, consequently, might trigger "real" societal change. Figure 1 synthetizes the methods and phases of local level empirical research and analysis.

Figure 2

Methods used to collect and analyze data



Source: Own compilation, design by Tímea Mária Cseh

Through the LSQAs we tried to obtain an integrated analysis of the processes under investigation. Nevertheless, it might be useful to make a distinction between the aims, tools and epistemological status of our quantitative and qualitative data gathering. The main aim of the quantitative analysis was to

describe along pre-defined indicators the migratory processes and demographic trends of the municipalities. This comparative analysis aimed to construct typologies of the municipalities based on their developmental position, demographic and migratory trends. By the related qualitative research we aimed at identifying the discursive frameworks through which different actors (young migrants and stakeholders) interpret migration and development. We used narrative-biographic and semi-structured interviews, respectively focus groups to investigate the perspectives of young migrants and semi-structured interviews to map the interpretative frameworks of local stakeholders. In some instances, we used the interviews as data/information source (explanatory research) concerning different population and developmental processes. Nevertheless, interviews were used primarily to identify the perceptions and representations of the actors (which, however, may orient future policies and may shape future migratory trends etc.).

The quantitative research meant primarily a systematic data collection and secondary analysis of data concerning demographic and migratory trends, respectively a population projection carried out at municipality level.

(1) Quantitative research relied on systematic data collection and secondary analysis. Collected data covered population processes (structure of population, life expectancy at birth, fertility, internal and international migration in all possible directions) and economic trends (GDP per capita, employment rates, job vacancies, average wages, investments) at both national and municipality level. Time series for population and economic processes were collected for the 1990–2016 period in order to provide a sufficiently long historical perspective.

(2) As part of the quantitative research local level population projections were carried out. The projections were based on cohort-component method and modelled the population processes of the seven municipalities for the time period between 2017 and 2035. Four scenarios were elaborated in case of each municipality, the hypotheses concerning fertility and mortality being identical in all scenarios and hypotheses concerning migration making the difference between them. Cohort-component population projections require the application of a rigorous mathematical methodology. Nevertheless, the results of our projections should not be interpreted as forecasts or prognoses concerning the probable future development of the population processes. It is better to interpret our results as “what-if” type statements, as we do not pretend that they indicate the “real” future trends of the processes under investigation. “What-if type” statements might be informative from a policy perspective, as they indicate how assumptions con-

cerning different factors affect future population dynamics. One should also emphasize that hypotheses concerning future migratory movements depend also on future expectations. When drafting the hypotheses our colleagues took into account both the existing trends and the anticipations of local experts and stakeholders. Consequently, the results of this exercise mirror not only the current and exactly defined demographic trends but also the future visions of the involved actors.

(3) The interviews with institutional actors were based on a common interview guide that covered the following aspects: institutional career of the interviewed person, perceptions of developmental positions and prospects of the municipality, personal and institutional perspectives on different types of migration, policy capacities and challenges connected to youth migration, problems with measuring migration. This research phase had multiple aims. First, it was an explorative phase in which we tried to identify relevant trends and patterns of youth affecting the given locality. Second, we wanted to map the existing policies focusing on migration and youth including both separate projects and permanent programs of the different institutions. Third, we aimed at mapping discourses concerning migration. In this respect it was also of central importance how decision makers connect development and migration. We wanted to find out whether they perceive different types of migration as a threat or as an opportunity. We focused on both immigration and emigration (even in localities where immigration was barely relevant statistically). We also tried to distinguish between the perception of highly skilled and low status migrants, between that of national majority and different minority categories (such as Roma or other ethnic groups). In this paper perceptions and discourses concerning development and migration will be of primal importance. In case of each locality similar types of stakeholders were interviewed. Local level political actors (among them the mayor or vice-mayor of the municipality, figures of – in some cases "politically incorrect" – opposition), representatives of the educational institutions, labor force offices, entrepreneurs engaged in managing migration or employing migrant labor force, NGO activists were selected. We asked our local partners to conduct at least 7 interviews that they had to register and to report according to a previously elaborated grid. A total number of 65 institutional interviews were completed (see Annex 2).

(4) In case of the interviews with young migrants we asked our local partners to conduct narrative-biographical interviews with 8–10 young migrants per locality. This method provides a rigorous and previously fixed technique of conducting and interpreting interviews. It is important that through using this

technique we did not subordinate the stories (meaning the self-representation) of migrants to our own scientifically or politically motivated narratives.[2] The interviewed migrants had the opportunity to present their story less constrained. Each interview had third phases. In the third phase (main narrative) our interlocutors could tell their stories without being guided by the researcher. The second phase (narrative follow up) was also conducted according to the rules of narrative-biographical interviewing, while the third phase was in fact identical with a semi-structured interview. In this third phase we asked our respondents about their views on receiving and sending countries, decisions to migrate, perceptions of development, diaspora membership and perceptions of other migrant groups. We targeted people between ages 18–35 of different educational attainment, gender, family status and type of migratory experience (emigrants, immigrants, returning migrants, daily commuters between different countries). We preferred to interview migrants from- and to Danube region, in order to have an outlook of the regional migratory system. However, in case other countries of destination or origin were of primal importance we did not ignore them completely. A total number of 70 migrant interviews were conducted and reported through a previously elaborated grid. In case of 28 interviews (4 interviews per locality) we asked for English language transcription of the whole material.[3]

(5) Through the focus group interviews, conducted also with young migrants, we completed the individual in-depth interviews. The topic of the talks focused primarily on the participants' experiences with migration, paying special attention to the administrative aspects of the migration process (i.e. their contacts with the local (and other level) administration, the problems they encountered, their opinion about the policies employed by the relevant authorities etc.). One discussion was conducted per locality with 6–10 participants in each group. All participants were 18–34 aged people with migratory experience. In sending localities they were mostly returning migrants, while in case of receiving municipalities immigrants were selected. In municipalities with a mixed pattern of migration: both immigrants and return migrants could participate in the focus group. Focus groups were also audio recorded and reported according to a previously fixed template. In more concrete terms we asked our participants about personal experiences with the authorities relevant in migratory issues

[2] See Rosenthal (1993); Smith et al. (1994) for the narrative-biographic method.

[3] In case of Graz, due to material constrains, no English language translation was provided but we received the German language transcription. In case of interviews conducted in Hungarian and Romanian we were able to go through the original versions too. In case of Burgas we did not receive the translations.

(work permits, residence permits, recognition of diplomas etc.) and we asked them to provide suggestions concerning migration policies.

1.3. Relation to the Conceptual Framework of the project

The first working paper compiled in the project, authored by Fassmann, Gruber and Németh (2018), might be considered as a guideline for various work packages including LSQAs and in this respect it is closely connected to the present synthetic report. This document had a key role in understanding and operationalizing youth migration. Working Paper 1 (WP1) already defined the major types of youth migration, offered macro-, meso- and micro-level theoretical explanations of migratory movements and introduced topics connected to migration, among others the developmental consequences of migration.

In this paper, as in the LSQAs, we used the definition of migration elaborated by the Vienna team. According to this migration refers to a longer-term relocation of individuals' main place of residence. YOUMIG focuses on different form of international migration meaning forms of longer term relocation that crosses state borders. Based on YOUMIG WP1, the LSQAs distinguished between immigration, emigration, return migration and cross-border commuting. WP1 also distinguished between long and short term migration. According to UN definition short-time migrant is *"a person who moves to a country other than that of his or her usual residence for a period of at least 3 months but less than a year (12 months) except in cases where the movement to that country is for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage."* (UN 1998: 18, cited by Fassmann el al. 2018: 12)

Next to this close connection, differences should also be highlighted. Our working paper focuses primarily on developmental hierarchies, as they appear cognitively and materially, and takes a historical-structuralist approach. At the heart of WP1, elaborated by the Vienna team there was an individualistic (rational choice) approach of migration and the so called life-cycle model that connects migration to certain turning points of the life-course (e.g. education, entering the labor market, establishing a family etc.). We acknowledge that this is a productive way of connecting the concept of youth with that of migration. Working Paper 2, however, focuses on the Danube Region as a hierarchical space and tries to show that the migration of youth takes place in an area char-

acterized by uneven development. This is why development and developmental hierarchies are central in our WP. Further work and research is needed to synthetize these approaches (the individualistic one of the Vienna team and the historical-structuralist one represented by this WP) a work that we were unable to finalize in this WP.

1.4. Preliminary conceptual remarks

As for the conceptual framework used in this working paper, structural aspects and socio-spatial developmental hierarchies are of primal importance. It is also important that we conceptualize developmental hierarchies at two levels, namely material and cognitive ones. The first level of analysis is the material one, where our approach is connected to word-system and dependency theories. These theories focus on unequal economic exchanges between center and periphery (Sassen 2005) and also argue that migratory flows are part of these unequal flows (Portes-Böröcz 1989; Melegh 2016). A similar hierarchic representation of the socio-spatial relations was used by Skeldon (1997).

On a second level, socio-spatial hierarchies might also be perceived as discursive or cognitive structures. As for our region, numerous analysists emphasized that a certain kind of discursive order is also constitutive part of the unequal relation between different parts of Europe. Larry Wolff's (1994) expression of "demi-Orientalism", Ezekiel Adamovsky's (2006) "Euro-Orientalism" and Maria Todorova's (2009) "Balkanism" all emphasize that socio-spatial hierarchies are historically and culturally constructed and describe certain parts of Europe (e.g. Eastern Europe, the Balkans) as lacking the sophisticated social relations and institutions characterizing Western societies. Attila Melegh (2006) used the expression of East-West slope to describe a powerful historically constructed global-hierarchical evaluative scheme that puts Western core countries on the top of the hierarchy and evaluates all other countries according to the distance/proximity to the core.

In this respect, Arland Thornton's (2005) concept of *developmental idealism* and the research conducted in the framework of the Developmental Idealism Studies network is of primal importance. Developmental idealism is a cultural model, or a set of values and beliefs strongly connected to the idea of developmental hierarchies. It is based on the idea that all societies across the globe (should) follow essentially the same developmental pathway. As a

consequence, societies (countries, regions etc.) could be ranked and hierarchized according to their level of development (civilization, advancement, etc.). People attached to developmental idealism generally claim that it is a universal model and it certainly grounds an emerging global culture (Thornton, Dorius and Swindle, 2015, p.284). Surveys conducted in the framework of Developmental Idealism Studies research program have shown that ordinary people around the globe are well "aware" of developmental hierarchies. As for our region, such surveys were conducted in Bulgaria in 2009, in Hungary in 2010, and in Romania in 2014 and 2016 (Melegh et al. 2013, Csánó 2013; Melegh et al. 2016, Kiss 2017). These surveys have demonstrated that ordinary people deeply internalize the idea of developmental hierarchies which they perceive quite similarly to the representations circulated by global elites. Consequently, developmental idealism and the idea of developmental hierarchies shape to a great extent their self-perception and strategies of social reproduction and mobility. As Melegh (2012) emphasized, accepting and interiorizing developmental hierarchies might be perceived as driver conducting to migration. One might mention the notion of culture of migration in this context. This refers to societies where migration becomes a usual and required life event and it is conductive as such to an increase of social status (Cohen 2004; Ali 2007; Horváth 2008). The argument that through their migration people try in fact to "climb" the developmental slope is not necessarily a contrary but rather a complementary argument to neo-classical assumption of wage-maximizing migrants.[4]

[4] This assumption, respectively a revised version of the push and pull model played a key role in the theoretical framing of the Youmig project. See Fassmann et al. (2018).

2. National developmental positions and migration as seen in demographic and material processes from a global perspective

2.1. National developmental positions and migration

As many researchers emphasized, it is rather difficult to build up a general theory concerning the relation between developmental processes and positions on the one hand and migratory experiences on the other. Nevertheless, such generalizations that are deeply rooted in presumptions and ideologies concerning development (de Haas 2010; 2012) exist and shape profoundly policies and future expectations concerning migration (de Haas, 2010; Melegh, 2012). We will discuss in details different interpretations concerning development and the development-migration nexus in the fourth and fifths chapters of the working paper. Now we should emphasize that both historical structuralist approaches (connected to world-system and dependency theories) and the migration transition approach might be insightful when analyzing the migratory processes of the Danube region.

As for the world-system and dependency theories, one might cite Böröcz (2009; 2015) who argued that this line of argumentation is particularly insightful in case of former Eastern Bloc countries. He sees state socialism as an attempt to isolate Eastern European societies from the unequal exchanges characterizing global economy and its core-periphery logic (Böröcz, 2015: 6–7). This attempt was not successful however, and resulted in a double dependency,

or as Böröcz called it in a state socialist block inside the capitalist world order (Böröcz 2009).[5] In spite of their failure to isolate Eastern European states from the global economic processes, state socialist regimes were partially successful in regulating certain social processes among them the demographic development and migratory flows. The collapse of these regimes could be perceived as the abolition of state control over these processes, while starting with the 1990s these societies and populations returned *"to that part of global productive assets of humankind that is valorized by global capital without the interference of the socialist state"* (Böröcz 2015, p.21). From the perspective of dependency theories, this historical restoration was barely triumphant. The incumbent structural adjustments resulted in a severe economic decline and restated the semi-peripheral position of these states characteristic before World War II.

As for the migration transition theories, the model of migration cycles should be mentioned. The model elaborated by Okólski (2012) and Fassmann and Reeger (2012) is a variant of migration transition theories combined with neo-liberal expectations concerning development. It is *"based on the assumption that all European nations states develop from emigration into immigration countries"* (Fassmann-Reeger, 2012: 5). Similar to Zelinsky's (1976) original model, the importance of demographic evolution is emphasized. European countries experience continuously low rates of fertility, negative natural growth and population ageing. As a consequence, there is an acute shortage of labor force, first of all (but not exclusively) in the secondary sector of the labor market. Under such circumstances, neither economic growth nor the welfare system could be sustained without a significant influx of migrants. Fassmann's and Reeger's innovation was that instead of an "objective teleology"[6] they emphasized the central role of political agency in migration transition. They argued that advanced societies *should* go through certain phases of adaptation and *should* develop mechanisms to face the consequences of the aforementioned demographic evolution. This adaptation leads first to legal and institutional changes. European countries redefine their migration and citizenship policies and move towards a more inclusive and seldom reformulated immigration policy. It is also important that, according to their model, public opinion also accepts immigration and high levels of inflows. In other words, inclusive policies of immigration and tol-

[5] Double dependency meant that some Eastern Bloc states took loans from international monetary institutions and became indented, while their economic and foreign policy was also under intra-block constrains.

[6] See Stark-Bruszt (1998).

erant public opinions are prerequisites of transition of emigration countries into immigration ones. From the perspective of the migration cycles theory, former Soviet Bloc countries that face similar demographic challenges as the Western European ones are considered as “not-yet-immigration countries” (Fassmann et al. 2014: 25). This is connected to optimistic developmental expectations on the one hand and on migration transition theory on the other.

As already mentioned, Skeldon (1997) combined migration cycle theories with an emphasis on existing socio-spatial inequalities. Migration transition and migration cycle theories expect that all societies go through similar phases both in their economic development and migratory processes. However, in case of migration this expectation lacks relational approach. Some countries (called emerging or potential core by Skeldon) might become new countries of immigration only if other countries were transformed to their “labor frontiers”. Skeldon – similarly to adepts of migration transition theories – hypothesizes that in case of countries belonging to the same “developmental tier” there are regularities in migratory movements. However, it is an empirical question whether an individual country will develop and join the core countries or will remain in the labor frontier (that under the circumstances of low fertility might cause depopulation). According to the model provided by Skeldon one might distinguish between four developmental tiers. The first category is that of old and new core countries. In case of these countries the expectations of migration cycle theory might be valid and a constantly high level of outflows might be hypothesized. The second category is that of potential core countries. In case of these countries migratory processes will be similar to that of the old and new core if only they are successful in catch up type development. The third category is that of countries belonging to the labor frontiers. This developmental tier is closely connected to the core and provides the labor force needed for the development of the core. The third developmental tier is called resource niche, where the penetration of the core economies is less accentuated and migratory flows are more accidental. Former Eastern Bloc countries were characterized by Skeldon (1997: 121) as a potentially restructuring core, thus allowing for the possibility that they might become countries of immigration. However, he also emphasized that – at the moment of his analysis – the majority of the former Eastern Bloc countries was part of the labor frontier of the Western European core.

Living aside the global perspective and focusing strictly on the Danube region, one might ask which of the countries was more successful in the process

of socio-economic restructuring. Bohle and Greskovits (2012: 46) analyzed the different pathways of the international integration of the Eastern European post-socialist market societies. They took into account the structure of the industrial sector and the quality/costs of the labor force[7] and distinguished between semi-core and semi-peripheral positions characterizing different Eastern-European countries. They argued that the "Visegrád" (among them the Hungarian and Slovak) and the Slovene economies adopted semi-core characteristics. This means a combination of high proportion of complex industries and relatively qualified labor force. However, these economies remained dependent on the "core" in both capital and technological transfer. Bohle and Greskovits characterized the Romanian, Bulgarian and Serbian economies as *semi-peripheral*, meaning a high share of low added value industries (ex. textile and wood-industries) and the export of raw materials. Obviously, our remaining Danube region countries, Austria and Germany might be characterized as belonging to the Western European economic core. Marek Okólski (2012), otherwise an adept of migration cycle theories, emphasized the existence of the so called subsistence sector, meaning agricultural production partially for one's own consumption. In Romania, and to a less extent in Bulgaria and Serbia, large sectors of subsistence agriculture have appeared as a consequence of de-industrialization (Horváth-Kiss 2016) and this also affected the position of these countries in the European migratory system.

When analyzing migratory movements in the Danube region the following aspects should be emphasized. First, the character of exchanges between different countries/societies is unequal and migratory processes are part of the unequal flows. Second, we need a hierarchic representation of the socio-spatial relations taking into account these inequalities. Skeldon (1997) globally focused hierarchical model distinguishing between core, potential (or restructuring) core and labor frontiers might be useful but Bohle's and Greskovits's (2012) characterization, distinguishing between core, semi-core and semi-periphery, might also be used. Third, there is no "objective teleology" either in developmental pathways or in migratory processes. All Danube region countries face some similar demographic tendencies, such as fertility rates well below the level of simple reproduction and population ageing. In case of semi-core

[7] Bohle and Greskovits (2012: 46) used four variables, namely the proportion of complex industries as share of total manufacturing, the proportion of complex (high added value) goods as share of the total export, the proportion of FDI directed to complex industries as share of the total FDI and unit labor cost in complex industries compared to the Austrian labor costs.

and semi-peripheral societies these tendencies are aggravated by intensive out-migration. As we will see in some cases, this might be seen as a form of depopulation (Horváth-Kiss 2016; Melegh 2016). However, we do not hypothesize that these societies will react similarly to these challenges. Political agency is of central importance. “Adaptation” to similar demographic challenges is not necessarily conductive to the same end. This is why we stress the importance of perceptions and interpretative frameworks of developmental, demographic and migratory processes.

This working paper does not aim to provide a comparative analysis of the economic development of the countries under investigation. We would like to emphasize only that there were significant historical changes in the relative economic positons of these countries during the post-World War II period. During the 1950s and 1960s there was an economic growth in all of these countries, which was in 1970s and 1980s followed by stagnation throughout the former Eastern Bloc.

Figure 3

GDP per capita in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia between 1950 and 2016



Source: 2018 Updated version of Maddison Project Database
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018

One should also emphasize that an even less optimistic perspective evolves if one compares the GDP/capita of our countries to the world average. First, compared to the world average, even Austria and Germany are also in decline following 2000. This is not only due to the rapid increase of economies such as China and India but it might be observed in a trans-Atlantic comparison too. Second, in relative terms the contraction of Eastern European economies seems more dramatic. Except Slovakia, none of them reached its relative position of 1980s until now. According to the 2018 version of the Maddison database in Serbia the GDP per capita was 2.4 compared to world average in 1982 and it was 0.9 in 2016. In Hungary it this value was 2.2 in 1984 and 1.6 in 2016. In Romania: 1.6 in 1984 and 1.2 in 2016. In Slovenia 2.4 in 1986 and 1.8 in 2016.

Figure 4

GDP per capita in Austria, Bulgaria, Germany, Hungary, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia and Slovenia compared to the world average between 1950 and 2016



Source: 2018 Updated version of Maddison Project Database
https://www.rug.nl/ggdc/historicaldevelopment/maddison/releases/maddison-project-database-2018

The following particularities are also worthy to be highlighted. The Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Serbia successfully improved their GDP/capita

during the 1950–1980 period and were in a relatively favorable position (compared to the other Eastern Bloc countries) during the 1980s. This turned into a drastic economic collapse and long term stagnation in case of Serbia following the Yugoslav succession wars. On might argue that it moved from a semi-core position toward a semi-peripheral one (in parallel not only with the decline of GDP per capita but also the collapse of its higher value added industry). Slovenia maintained its relatively advantageous position until 2008, however (compared to other Eastern European countries) it was hit particularly hard by the emerging economic crisis. Romania was relatively successful during the 1960s and 1970s, respectively following 2000. The relative position of Slovakia has improved considerably its position and one might argue that it moved from a semi-peripheral position toward a semi-core one. In case of Hungary and Bulgaria one might witness a stagnation and long term loss of relative positions.

The Danube region as a whole is characterized by a slight population loss. At regional level, negative demographic evolutions are caused primarily by low values of fertility and migratory processes. Nevertheless, population processes differ significantly both by countries and – as we will see in the next chapter – lower level territorial units, the most important factor being diverging trends of internal and international migration.

As for the position in the migratory system of the countries we use the categories proposed by Skeldon (1997). His distinction between core, potential core and labor frontier might be meaningful when comparing the investigated countries and municipalities. According to his argument (connected to the theory of migration transition), all core countries have already become countries of immigration (see also Fassmann and Reeger 2012). These societies are characterized by labor shortage due primarily to negative natural growth. Economic and population balance are maintained through a relatively large level of inflows. Based on this assumption semi-core (which in case of Eastern Europe was called “restructuring core” by Skeldon) might also turn into a region of immigration. Former Eastern Bloc countries are also characterized by negative demographic growth and – in case of successful economic reconstruction – by labor shortage. Contrary, countries belonging to the labor frontier are unable to attract considerable numbers of immigrants, while send large numbers of emigrants. In case of the South-Eastern parts of the Danube region, large scale emigration combined with low fertility might be conductive to depopulation and deep socio-economic crisis.

As for their general demographic development, the countries under investigation might be classified in four categories. (1) In the first category enters Bulgaria and Romania, where one might witness a drastic population decline. One should also emphasize that official data certainly overestimate population size and underestimate population loss (Kiss 2013). Both countries could be considered as belonging to the labor frontier of the Western European core. (2) Serbia and Hungary enter the second category, where less radical population decline was registered compared to Romania and Bulgaria. (3) In case Slovenia and Slovakia population processes were relatively balanced and a slight population growth of 2–3 percent was registered. (4) In Austria (being the sole representative of the fourth category) there was a dynamic population growth of 14 percent during the 1991–2017 period. In what follows, we will discuss migratory movements first at national and then at municipality level.

As official data sources severely underestimate emigration, it might be misleading to investigate migratory processes exclusively on these sources. In what follows we will discuss the migratory processes of different groups of countries based primarily on bilateral matrixes of the emigrant and immigrant stock provided by the United Nations.

Changes of immigrant and emigrant stock do not depend solely on migratory processes but are affected by many factors. UN bilateral matrices on migrant stock use immigration statistics of receiving countries (considered consensually as more reliable compared to official registration of emigration) and define migrants either by country of birth or by citizenship depending on available data: *"in estimating the international migrant stock, international migrants have been equated with the foreign born population whenever this information is available, which is the case in most countries or areas. In most countries lacking data on place of birth, information on the country of citizenship of those enumerated was available, and was used as the basis for the identification of international migrants, thus effectively equating, in these cases, international migrants with foreign citizens"* (UN 2017: 3).Estimations based on country of birth should be considered more reliable as they do not depend on highly variable processes of naturalization. One should note that in our region the naturalization of emigrants in many cases precedes the process of residing. Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia and Hungary offer extra-territorial citizenship for ethnic kin and many emigrants entering these countries belong to kin communities across the border. In other cases, naturalization might be a long bureaucratic process; however, following this process, newly naturalized individuals are no more counted

as belonging to the migrant stock. If relied on country of birth estimations of migrant stock no more depend on the process of naturalization. However, even in this case, changes depend on the age structure and mortality of the migrant population[8] and not solely on new arrivals (or exits). Nevertheless, changes of immigrant and emigrants stocks are more reliable indicators of migratory processes, compared to flows registered by the authorities of sending countries.

Table 1

Emigrant stock in Danube region countries in the period between 1990 and 2017

	Labor frontier			*Semi-core*			*Core*	
	Bulgaria	*Romania*	*Serbia*	*Hungary*	*Slovakia*	*Slovenia*	*Austria*	*Germany*
1990	617 155	813 087	708 804	386 934	133 461	91 652	505 818	*3 277 677*
1995	653 122	977 110	921 409	404 007	191 995	108 821	490 466	3 280 566
2000	690 700	1 139 120	1 133 078	420 151	251 864	118 891	475 241	3 350 817
2005	909 442	2 106 961	927 661	466 444	273 559	119 913	493 066	3 585 342
2010	1 127 247	3 274 229	846 196	527 760	294 714	124 470	515 071	3 850 095
2015	1 166 722	3 412 055	931 921	587 121	335 780	134 338	532 718	4 032 652
2017	1 291 630	3 578 504	956 455	636 782	356 310	143 500	586 161	4 208 083

Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

[8] Birth rates and fertility are irrelevant, as newborns of migrant background are not counted as belonging to the migrant stock (according to their country of birth). In other words, migrant stocks defined by country of birth might reproduce only through newly arriving immigrants.

Table 2

Immigrant stock in Danube region countries in the period between 1990 and 2017

	Labor frontier			*Semi-core*			*Core*	
	Bulgaria	*Romania*	*Serbia*	*Hungary*	*Slovakia*	*Slovenia*	*Austria*	*Germany*
1990	21 510	135 825	99 269	347 510	41 295	178 077	793 239	*5 936 181*
1995	32 435	135 037	630 221	322 234	69 323	174 419	894 893	7 464 406
2000	43 360	126 949	856 763	296 957	116 376	171 018	996 547	8 992 631
2005	61 074	145 162	845 120	366 787	130 491	197 276	1 136 270	9 402 447
2010	76 287	166 126	826 066	436 616	146 319	253 786	1 275 992	9 812 263
2015	133 803	281 048	807 441	475 508	177 624	237 616	1 492 374	10 220 418
2017	153 803	370 753	801 903	503 787	184 642	244 790	1 660 283	12 165 083

Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

One should mention again that the Danube region has been characterized by divergent trends of migration. These divergences can be noticed already since the end of the World War II. During state socialism former Eastern Bloc countries tried to limit their exits. Yugoslavia was an exception in this respect, as the number of Yugoslav guest workers increased following the 1960s. One should also note that during state socialism – with the notable exception of Hungary following 1987 (Szőke 1990) – none of these countries experienced significant trends of immigration. Meanwhile, Germany and Austria have evidently become countries of immigration, receiving many immigrants and guest workers from the labor frontiers of the Western European core (Fassmann and Münz 1994). Following 1990, three patterns might be distinguished. In Austria and Germany, belonging to the Western European core, immigration has intensified. Fassmann et al. (2014: 49–50) argued that in these countries immigration policies were rather consensual and the public opinion was permissive toward migration, as they *"already learned to treat immigration politically, instrumentally as well as in the public discourse"*. Slovakia, Hungary and Slovenia there was a slightly positive migration balance, meaning that both emigration and immigration were characteristic. These coun-

tries – belonging to the European semi-core according to Bohle and Greskovits (2012) – were characterized as "emerging countries of immigration" by Fassmann et al. (2014). Romania, Bulgaria, and Serbia became undoubtedly 'emigration countries' and constitutive parts of Western Europe's labor frontiers following the regime change.

2.2. New labor frontiers: turning into countries of emigration

Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia might be classified as parts of the Western European labor frontier today. As mentioned already, in case of Serbia this is not a new development at all, as labor migration toward Western countries has begun during the early 1970s. Consequently, the emigrant stock compared to the resident population was rather high already in 1990s: more than 700,000 people born in Serbia resided abroad, meaning 9.1 percent compared to the country's population.

Outmigration was present in case of Romania and Bulgaria too. One might argue that state socialist authorities exercising control over migratory flows did not target to stop outmigration but to select those let to go (Horváth 2005). Ethnic selection of emigrants and ethnic engineering has played a pivotal role in both countries and, consequently, ethnic and religious minorities were highly overrepresented among emigrants. In these migrations of ethnic un-mixing – as Brubaker (1998) called them – the ethnically selective immigration policy of the main receiving countries also played a crucial role. In case of Bulgaria the emigration of Turks (and Muslims in general) toward Turkey has a one and a half century long history, as it started in the late 19th century after Bulgaria gained independence. This process of emigration continued following World War II and more than 268,000 Bulgarian citizens left for Turkey during the 1948–1984 period. In 1989, the party state led by Todor Zhivkov launched an anti-Turkish campaign and *"declared that Turkey should prove its democracy by opening the borders to Bulgarian citizens, including Muslims, who had been given the right to travel wherever they wanted"* (Vasileva 1992: 367). Consequently, another 369,839 Bulgarian Muslims fled, profoundly altering the ethnic makeup of the country. According to the statistics presented by Vasileva (1992: 368) 154,937 of them returned ultimately to Bulgaria. In 1990 the country had a rather high emigrant stock of 617,000, representing 7.1 percent of the resident population. 75% of the Bulgarian emigrants resided in Turkey.

Figure 5

Emigrant stock compared to resident population in countries belonging to the labor frontier (%)



Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

In Romania outflows were also significant but compared to resident population much lower than in Bulgaria. Despite the closed borders more than 783,000 persons left Romania officially during the era of state socialism (Muntele 2003). Although emigration was not exclusively reduced to ethnic minorities, they have been overrepresented in emigration flows. A significant part of the Jewish community left Romania after the World War II (Bines, 1998; Ioanid, 2005), while the mass emigration of Transylvanian Saxons and Banat Swabians begun in the late 1970s (Fassmann and Münz, 1994, Münz and Ohliger, 2001). The wave of Hungarian emigrants appeared spontaneously in the second half of the 1980s, and the Romanian state proved to be unable to control the outflows (Horváth and Kiss 2016). In the first three years after the regime change and the liberalisation of passports approximately 170,000 people emigrated from Romania as a result of the unfavourable economic and political situation. Emigration flows reached the peak in 1990 when the almost entire German minority left the country. This

process was encouraged by the assistance offered by the Federal Republic of Germany too. Furthermore, ca. 100,000 Hungarians also left Transylvania between 1988 and 1992, and Hungarians remained over-represented among the emigrants throughout the whole 1990s.

Figure 6

Immigrant stock compared to resident population in countries belonging to the labor frontier (%)



Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

Foreign born population among residents was rather low in all of the three countries in 1990. The highest proportion (1.1 percent of the resident population) was in Serbia; however, this was a consequence of internal migratory flows in Yugoslavia. The majority of "immigrants" came from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia and most probably ethnic Serbs were overrepresented among them. One should also emphasize that Serbia (hosting also the federal capital of Belgrade) was not a particularly attractive target for internal migrants in Yugoslavia. In case of Romania and Bulgaria the proportion of foreign born population was even lower. In Romania foreign born population was consisted

mainly by ethnic Romanians who were born in territories ceded to the Soviet Union (Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina) and Bulgaria (Southern Dobruja or *Cadrilater*). In case of Bulgaria the most numerous groups among foreign born were those from the Soviet Republics of Russia, Ukraine, Moldova and Armenia.

Figure 5 shows that Serbia is a rather special case. Following the disorganization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia the number and proportion of foreign born population has increased dramatically in Serbia, as more than 700 thousand Serbs fled the former Yugoslav Republics. The most numerous group was that of Serbs from Bosnia and Croatia. These latter have left the country as a consequence of the "Operation Storm" launched by the Croatian army in 1995. One should also emphasize that these numbers do not contain people born in the Republic of Kosovo, unrecognized by Serbia. As mentioned already, Serbia was classified (along Hungary) among countries with a relatively moderated population loss. This was due only to these waves of refugees following the ethnic wars lost by Serbia and the Serb enclaves of Croatia and Bosnia.

In Romania and Bulgaria foreign born populations have begun to grow significantly only following 2010. This process had two major sources: return migration (or statistical registration) of foreign born Romanian and Bulgarian children on the one hand and "real" immigration on the other. In case of Romania this "return migration" is more visible statistically. In 2017 there were 148,445 people born in the European Union, among them 50,893 born in Italy and 39,492 born in Spain. According to Eurostat data (differing from UN migration matrix), in case of "Spanish immigrants" the proportion of 0–14 aged children was of 94.2 percent, while in case of the "Italians" of 85.9 percent.[9] It is likely that these figures represent neither immigrants nor returning migrants but children of Romanian emigrants registered in Romania (too). In Bulgaria might be a similar situation with those born in Greece, Germany, Italy and Spain (however to a lesser extent).

Next to this illusion produced by the statistical, there are "real" inflows in Romania and Bulgaria too. In case of Bulgaria, the most significant influx comes from the former Soviet Republics, namely Russia (with more than 30,000 immigrants in 2017), Ukraine (with a stock of almost 10,000 immigrants), Armenia,

[9] In case of Italy figures were lower as there were "real" Italian immigrants too, mostly middle aged men establishing businesses in Romania.

Kazakhstan and Georgia. In case of Romania, Moldovans constitute the most numerous group of immigrants. Moldovan born people numbered more than 50,000 already in 1990) and their number has not increased significantly until 2010 (see Horváth-Kiss 2016 on this issue). Following 2010, however, immigration from Moldova increased drastically and in 2017 the number of those born in Moldova was more than 150,000, meaning that Romania proved to be successful in attracting Moldovan immigrants.

Turning into a labor frontier of the Western core and, consequently, becoming an emigration country was the most visible in case of Romania. The country had an only 3.5 percent emigrant stock in 1990, consisting mainly of ethnic minorities (Jews, Germans and Hungarians). In 2017 the emigrant stock compared to resident population was of 18.2 (meaning 3,6 million Romanian born people residing abroad), a figure identical to that of Bulgaria, a country which started with a larger emigrant stock in 1990. One can identify several distinct phases of the Romanian emigration following 1989 (Baldwin and Edwards, 2005; Diminescu, 2009; Horváth and Anghel, 2009; Lăzăroiu, 2004; Sandu, 2006). (1) The first phase lasted roughly from 1990 to 1993, and it was characterized by the migration of ethnic minorities and asylum seekers. (2) Between 1993 and 1996, EU countries introduced a restrictive visa regime for Romanian citizens; consequently, in the mid-1990s, westward migration remained at relatively low levels. Hungary, Turkey and Israel became the most important target countries of shorter or longer term labor migration. (3) Between 1997 and 2001, the importance of emigration towards non EU-countries decreased while emigration to EU countries considerably increased. The importance of Germany and France as countries of destination declined, and new target countries for Romanian labor migration started to emerge. These targets were Italy and Spain. (4) One of the most important moments in the history of Romanian migration was 2002, when Romanian citizens were exempted from visa requirements in the majority of the EU countries. The costs and risks of emigration were reduced and, as a consequence, significantly more people engaged in migration. In parallel, various destination countries initiated programs of regularization of irregular immigration (Italy in 2002, Spain in 2005), and prospects of long-term legal residence became achievable for a considerable number of Romanian migrants. (5) In 2007, Romania became an EU member. The result of the new legal status of Romanian citizens within the EU there was both an increase in the volume and the legal opportunities of Romanian emigration. The highest inflows were registered in Italy and Spain. (6) A geographic

relocation of the main destination countries of Romanian migrants from the Mediterranean Area to (North)-Western Europe occurred following 2010. In Spain the Romanian emigrant stock decreased, while the number of those entering the country has considerably dropped. And contrary, in countries such as Germany, the United Kingdom or Belgium the numbers increased dynamically.

As already mentioned, In Bulgaria Muslims and Turks were highly overrepresented among emigrants during the communist regime. Those residing in Turkey represent a large proportion of the emigrant stock even today, however – as the outmigration of ethnic Bulgarians intensified – their proportion declined from 75% in 1990 to 44% in 2017. As for ethnic Bulgarians, the most important destinations are Spain, Germany and Austria, North America (USA, Canada), Greece, the United Kingdom and Italy. In 1990 relatively sizeable Bulgarian emigrant communities were in the German speaking countries, in North America and in Greece. Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom might be considered as totally novel destinations. The dynamics of the Romanian and Bulgarian migration shows important similarities. Both intensified following 2000, as consequence of the abolishment of visa requirements and moving the barriers of the free movement of the labor force.

The dynamics of outmigration from Serbia followed a different pathway. During the Balkan wars the emigrant stock has grown considerably and in 2000 it passed the number of 1 million or 15% compared to resident population (Lukić et al. 2013). Following 2000, however, outmigration from Serbia seems to be relatively moderate compared to Bulgaria and Romania.

2.3. Immigration and emigration in semi-core countries

Two of our “semi-core” countries, namely Slovakia and Slovenia gained their independence following the regime change. Consequently, one should consider internal migration too in order to understand migratory and population processes affecting these countries (or territories) during state socialism. The most important difference between Slovenia and Slovakia was in their relative developmental positon in Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, respectively. Slovenia was the most developed federal unit of Yugoslavia with important industrial capacities concentrating in its territory. Slovenian industrial companies not only found markets for their products in other federal republics but also recruited labor force there. Slovenian cities were attractive destinations

for migrants from other Yugoslav republics, primarily Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1990 there were 178,000 residents of Slovenia born outside the borders of the Federal Republic, 84% of them being internal migrants from the former Yugoslav republics (68,000 from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 48.000 from Croatia and 24,000 from Serbia). There was an inverse relation between Slovakia and Czechia. Slovakia had a negative balance of internal migration, with only 26,000 Czechs living in Slovakia and 70,000 Slovaks living in Czechia in 1990.

Figure 7

Immigrant stock compared to resident population in "semi-core" countries (%)



Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

In case of Hungary both foreign born population and emigrant stock were considerable in 1990. The immigrant stock was of 347,000, meaning 3.3 percent of the resident population. Ethnic Hungarians born in Romania represented by far the largest group (56% of the foreign born population). Some of them opted for Hungary following 1945 but the majority left Romania during the late 1980s.

In our three semi-core countries both emigrant and immigrant stocks have grown considerably following 1990. In case of Hungary, the influx of Hungarians from neighbouring countries was characteristic. In 2017 almost two thirds

of the foreign born population were from Romania, Slovakia and Romania. The immigration of Transylvanian Hungarians was continuous following 1990, while the number of Serbian and Ukrainian born population started to increase drastically following 2010. On should highlight that ethnic Hungarians entering the country are mostly Hungarian citizens (due to the modification of the citizenship legislation in 2010 granting extra-territorial citizenship). Germany, China and USA were other source countries. The Chinese diaspora in Hungary was of 18,000 in 2017. The foreign born population increased in the Slovenian case too, Bosnian, Serbian, Croatian and Kosovar citizens being the most numerous incoming groups. In case of Slovakia the most important source countries were Ukraine and the Czech Republic.

Figure 8

Emigrant stock compared to resident population in "semi-core" countries (%)



Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

The emigrant stock increased in all of the three countries under discussion during the period between 1990 and 2010 and it reached 6.5–6.9 percent compared to the resident population of these countries. The increase is not insignificant at all but it is not drastic compared to countries belonging to the labor frontier.

2.4. Austria: a core country of immigration

Austria is the sole country among the investigated ones, which can be characterized by population growth. However, its situation is paradoxical: next to population growth an ageing of the population is also characteristic. The TFR is not substantially higher compared to the investigated Eastern European states. The favorable population processes are due solely to high rates of immigration. Austria is the only immigration country among the investigated cases. Without immigration a significant population loss would be observed until 2050. One should also emphasize that a trend of urbanization is predominant in Austria, resulting in an increase of urban agglomeration and tendencies of shrinking in peripheral regions. Austria has developed into a country of immigration during the post-World War II period after having been an emigration country for decades (Fassmann and Münz 1995).

Figure 9

Immigrant stock compared to resident population in Austria and Germany (%)



Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

The Austrian population development in the post-World War II period has been mainly characterized by a growth due to a positive migration balance. Until the year 1973 high birth rates and immigration were causing the increase but after the economic downturn (oil crisis) the fertility rates started to decline and the population growth slowed down. Lower fertility rates led to a less dynamic natural balance, while migration became the main component of population growth.

Following 1990, the proportion of foreign born population increased from 10 to 19%. These figures might be considered as high even compared to Germany.

Germany, Serbia, Turkey and Bosnia Herzegovina remained the most important source countries of immigration in Austria, however Romanian, Czech, Polish and Hungarian emigrant communities have also grown dynamically, especially in the last 10 years. One should emphasize that neither emigrant stocks are insignificant, accounting for 6.6 percent of the resident population in 2017.

Figure 10

Emigrant stock compared to resident population in Austria and Germany (%)



Source: UN international migrant stock database
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/data/estimates2/estimates17.shtml

3. Migration and development at local level

3.1. Internal developmental positions: settlement hierarchy

The notion of *settlement hierarchy* is quite common in human geography. Through it, we emphasize the simple fact that the investigated municipalities are quite different in terms of population size, economic importance, institutional infrastructure and the coverage of services they offer[10] which also affect their position as migrant sending and migrant receiving localities. Our investigation focused on international migration which included only forms of spatial mobility crossing national borders. Through the notion of settlement hierarchy and through taking into account the internal developmental position of the investigated municipalities we would also like to emphasize the existing linkages between internal and international migration (Skeldon 2006; King-Skeldon 2010).

One of the investigated municipalities, Bratislava-Rača is a district of the capital city of Slovakia and, as such, it is a part of an important center of the whole Danube region. Five of the investigated municipalities, namely Burgas, Maribor, Szeged and Graz might be called as "main regional poles".[11] Two municipalities, namely Sfântu Gheorghe (in Hungarian *Sepsiszentgyörgy*) Kanjiža (in Hungarian *Magyarkanizsa*) are in a far lower position in the settlement hierarchy and they might be called zonal poles.

[10] YOUMIG is primarily a policy oriented project. In case it was primarily an academic enterprise, it would be indicated to choose more similar municipalities in order to make comparative analysis.

[11] We use here the categorization of functional urban areas of Romania employed by the World Bank (2017: 77). They classified localities according to their area of attraction.

Table 3

The position of the municipalities in the settlement hierarchy

	Population size	*Administrative status*	*Institutional infrastructure*	*Classification*
Bratislava-Rača	21,384	District of national capital	Residential area with relatively good infrastructure deserving resident population	Main regional poles
Graz	286,686	Seat of a federal state	University center, headquarter of regional institutions, economic center	
Burgas	209,331	Regional (oblast) seat	Important commercial and industrial center, headquarter of regional institutions, strong system of secondary education, some tertiary education	
Szeged	161,000	County seat	University center, headquarter of regional and county level institutions, economic center	
Maribor	111,079	Urban municipality	University center, headquarter of regional institutions, declining economy	
Sfântu Gheorghe	56,651	County seat	Some tertiary and strong secondary education, county level institutions, low added value industry	Zonal poles
Kanjiža	25,343	Urban municipality	Infrastructure deserving the community (primary and secondary education, administration, health care etc.)	

3.2. Bratislava-Rača: a residential area of the Slovak capital

It is difficult to analyze the socio-economic or demographic development of Rača in its own (as it would be a separate settlement), without taking into account that it is one of the 17 districts of the Slovak capital. Rača used to be a vineyard village and became part of Bratislava in 1946. The house estates construction began during the 1950s and transformed the rural area into a part of a large city. Constructions triggered an in-migration from other parts of Bratislava and Slovakia continued following the regime change due to the favorable infrastructural facilities of the district (one could reach the historical town center in 15 minutes). Basically this is a relatively well-off residential area without major industrial facilities and employers, such as Slovnaft oil refinery located in

Podunajske Biskupice or the Vokswagen factory in the Devínska Nová Ves district. During state socialism, several middle sized factories were located in Rača, engaged in wine production, cosmetics and manufacturing of professional optics. Following the process of privatization, they either were divided into smaller units or ceased to produce. Industrial areas were transformed to housing ones. Nevertheless the decrease of the industrial production cannot be perceived as an economic regression, as Bratislava as a whole performed relatively well. One might interpret the process of de-industrialization as a change of the function of this area inside the ecological structure of Bratislava. Rača also has an infrastructure that deserves some other needs of its residents next to housing. It has a well-developed pre-primary, primary and lower secondary educational system, composed of seven kindergartens and two elementary schools. An institutional system of upper secondary education is also present, vocational schools (specialized on mass media and information studies, information technology, polygraphy, hotel service, commerce and electro-technics) dominating the palette.

The population development in Rača followed the national trends in many aspects and it cannot be interpreted independently from that of Bratislava as a whole. An important difference compared to national tendencies can be observed in fertility trends. Similarly to the country as a whole the total fertility rate decreased to the extremely low levels at the beginning of 1990s. The indicator oscillated at the level of one child per woman until 2006, even below this level in some years. However, TFR has increased considerably in the last time period between 2006 and 2016 and reached the value of 1.9, thus being also much higher than the average of the national population. The life expectancy at birth is also above the national average. Males live two years longer than in Slovakia in general, while in case of females the difference is approximately 1 year. In the time period between 1994 and 2010 the natural increase was slightly below 0, while following this period a positive natural growth was experience due primarily to (relatively) high levels of fertility.

As a whole, the population has grown considerably, due primarily to inflows following 2010 of young families from all around Bratislava and Slovakia. In the 1990s the development was fluctuating, migration increases were alternating with migration decreases. Since 1999 (except for the year 2007), Rača has recorded migration gains. The height of net migration is influenced in particular by internal migration. The number of immigrants shows a growing tendency with increase being the most intense at the end of the reference period, with a peak

of 973 immigrants in 2016. This growth is closely linked to intensive housing construction. Residents are looking for attractive locations for living in Rača, particularly in terms of environment. Half of the immigrants arriving to Rača comes from the capital city and its surroundings (from the given NUTS 3), with 42 per cent of immigrants coming from other city districts of the capital. Internal out-migration is also present: around 400–500 persons left Rača annually in the reference period, but the net migration was positive even in spite of these figures.

International immigration is not insignificant. Public officials mentioned the Vietnamese community, which has its roots in the state socialist period. Following 1989 immigrants came mainly from Ukraine, Romania and Bulgaria. Regarding the emigration of young people, the target countries are the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria, Czech Republic or Ireland. As a main reason of emigration are considered low wages and the desire to acquire life experience. Commuting is also a common phenomenon, as many former residents of the districts bought houses in Austria and Hungary but continue to work in the Slovak capital city.

3.3. Graz: a regional pole in a core country

Graz is a seat of the Federal State *(Bundesland)* of Styria *(Steiermark)*, the second-largest city in Austria with a population of 286,686. With its agglomeration, it has more than 400,000 inhabitants. Education is perhaps the most important sector of the economy. Around 60,000 students are studying in the city's six universities and two collages. Next to students coming from all over Austria, these universities attract many youngsters coming from abroad, mostly from Germany and former Yugoslav republics. Graz is an important economic center. It offers around 180,000 working places, the tertiary sector and automotive cluster of manufacturing being the most important. Graz also serves as employer for workers residing in surrounding areas and therefore many commuters are coming to the city from other parts of Styria or from Slovenia.

Graz is a growing urban agglomeration in a country of immigration. Before 1990 the city was rather stagnating with suburbanization being important, but the Iron Curtain had also a negative effect on the cities demographic development (similarly to that of Vienna). Between 2002 and 2017, a total of roughly 58,000 new residents were registered in Graz, 1/3 of them from Austria and 2/3

from abroad. 59,850 foreign citizens (21%) are registered. The most important sending countries are Romania, ex. Yugoslav republics, Turkey and Germany. Although international immigration, Graz is still also experiencing outmigration when looking at internal migration – so suburbanization is still a valid topic. Youth migration, especially of students is still also from internal migration a big factor of population growth for the city. While Graz and its surroundings experience growth, the rest of the federal state of Styria are rather areas of stagnation and decline.

3.4. Maribor: declining industrial center searching for new prospects

Maribor is the second largest city of Slovenia, with 111,079 inhabitants. One should emphasize that Maribor was one of the most important industrial centers of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Almost all branches of industry were present (from textile to heavy industry), selling their products and services primarily in other federal entities of Yugoslavia and in countries of the "non-aligned movement" (Libya, Iraq, Syria, some Sub-Saharan countries) through bilateral agreements. Following the proclamation of independence, Maribor was hit by a particularly hard process of de-industrialization, as the firms based in the city lost both their (formerly) internal and external markets. Today the strongest industrial activities are still in the field of metal, food and wood processing, car parts manufacturing and energy production. University of Maribor was established in 1975 and today it constitutes the most important structure facilitating development. It consists of 17 faculties offering undergraduate and postgraduate programs. It employs a staff of 1,800 and has 15,000 students, many of them from abroad, mainly from ex. Yugoslav republics. As a university center and as a city hosting institutions deserving a regional clientele, one might characterize Maribor as a "main regional pole". However, as an industrial center it has been in decline since the late 1980s and its social and economic vitality is still weak today.

Similarly to Slovenia as a whole, Maribor was the target of internal migration from all over Yugoslavia following World War II. Employees of the large factories arrived especially from Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. The deindustrialization that followed the collapse of the Yugoslav state had an effect on population. Maribor had 103,961 inhabitants in 1991 and only 93,847 in 2002,

meaning an almost 10 percent decline in the first decade of the post-socialist period. The process of ageing is also characteristic. The population decline is due primarily to the negative balance of internal migration. The foreign born population has slowly increased in the period between 1991 and 2017. At the beginning of this period it accounted for 12, while at the end for 15 percent, surpassing slightly the proportions characterizing Slovenia. Data concerning outmigration from Maribor are rather scarce. An investigation focusing on return migration of recent Slovenian emigrants indicated that the majority of emigrants resided in Austria, Germany, Switzerland, UK, Belgium and Luxemburg. It is also important that Maribor and its surrounding area belong to the area of attraction of Graz and, consequently, many people found job in the neighboring Austria, creating a strong circular migration flow in the region. Automotive industry, metal processing and construction are estimated to be the major employers. It is hard to estimate the format of commuting – daily, weekly or monthly. However, many of them return to Slovenia daily.

3.5. Szeged: a well-off town in a stagnating region

Szeged, with its 161,000 inhabitants, is the largest city of south-eastern Hungary and one of the most important growth poles of the Great Hungarian Plain. It is situated next to the Romanian and Serbian border which made the city an important commercial and transit center. Szeged is an important university center, with twelve faculties and more than 20,000 students. Its area of attraction covers parts of eastern Hungary but many students from Serbia (most of them Hungarian ethnics) learn in the city. During state socialism, Szeged hosted mostly factories producing in light industry (textile, shoe-making, cloth-making, cannery) and food industry. Following the regime change, the former cluster proved to be less successful and many people working in industrial sector lost their jobs. Nevertheless, de-industrialization did not hit particularly hard Szeged, at least compared to cities, such as Miskolc or Pécs, hosting heavy industry and mining. Currently more than 20,000 businesses reside in the city, food industry, constructions, health industry, info-communication being the most important clusters. Some of Hungary's biggest firms, such as Pick Szeged in food industry or KÉSZ in construction have their headquarters in the town.

Szeged is a second echelon urban center of Hungary (Budapest being the only city in category of first echelon centers) that is outside of the economically

most prosperous area of the country (North-Western and Central Hungary). As such, it is in a similar position as Miskolc, Debrecen and Pécs. Compared to these towns (especially compared to Miskolc and Pécs), Szeged experienced a relatively balanced demographic development. One should emphasize the negative natural growth characterizing the town and the fact that the total fertility rate was also well below the national average. As for internal migration one might distinguish between several periods following 1990. Between 1990 and 1993 a positive net migration was characteristic. This turned to be negative in the period between 1994 and 2004. This was a period of rapid suburbanization, which meant that part of those who have ceased to be residents of Szeged keep being attached to the city without living in it. Between 2005 and 2015 the internal migration balance was positive again.

Official statistics concerning migration are less reliable, especially concerning the number of those who left the country. According to official figures, the number of total number of international immigrants accounted for 11,310 in the period between 1990 and 2016, while 5,814 people emigrated from the city abroad. Among the immigrants Hungarian citizens accounted for 42 percent (the majority of them being extra-territorial citizens from neighboring countries), while among the emigrants the proportion of native-born Hungarians was of 74 percent. As the LSQA emphasizes, the migratory processes affecting Hungary were experienced in Szeged, however, with several peculiarities. The inflow of Romanian and Serbian citizens was more characteristic in Szeged compared to other middle sized towns. The number of Serbian-born inhabitants was of 6000, while the number of Romanian born of 3000 in 2011. Especially in case of immigration from Serbia Szeged functions as a “gate city” of Hungary. Another aspect is that due to the importance of Szeged as a center of the tertiary education the age structure of immigrants is specific (and strikingly different from that of Hungary), the 19–24 age group being dominant.

3.6. Burgas: a growth pole of the labor frontier

Burgas includes 14 settlements: next to the city, one smaller town (Balgarovo) and 12 villages. The vast majority of its inhabitants (more than 200,000 of the 209,000) lives in the city of Burgas. The city is the most important industrial, commercial, transport and cultural center in south-eastern Bulgaria. Burgas has the biggest port in the country, the second busiest airport with a capacity of two

million passengers per year, and it is the only oil port in Bulgaria. Burgas has become one of the main industrial centers of Bulgaria during the state socialist period. This was also the period of a rapid population growth, as in 1946 the city had a population of 44,000. The city had been dominated by the chemical industry during state socialism and, as a main industrial center, it was hit hard by the regime change. It suffered considerable deindustrialization, and still has not fully recovered from this decline. Nevertheless, its industrial capacities are still important: near the city operates the largest chemical and oil refinery in south-eastern Europe, the manufacturing of various oil products, plastics and chemical products are also vital for the local industry. Shipbuilding, ventilation and climatic equipment, cargo carriages and fish processing are important sectors of the local industry too. One should also mention that a boom in tourism has occurred following 1990 and Burgas has become a destination of transnational importance. Tourism generated also labor force demand in construction: hundreds of hotels were built in Burgas and in the nearby costal area. As for its educational infrastructure, the strong system of upper secondary institutions (high schools) should be mentioned, which deserves a larger area in south-eastern Bulgaria. Burgas has several tertiary educational institutions too, however, the city is not among the major university centers of Bulgaria. Even the majority of students from Burgas choose to graduate in Sofia or abroad.

In case of Burgas the period between 1956 and 1989 was one of dynamic population growth, when the number of the population has almost tripled due primarily to large scale internal migration. Following the regime change, this growth has abruptly ended and following 1995 a slight decrease of the population has begun. In 1996 the population of Burgas municipality was of 220,000, while in 2016 it numbered only 209,100. One should emphasize that meanwhile administrative changes have occurred and some smaller settlements were attached to Burgas, meaning that the decrease of the population (of 5% taking into account the actual figures) would be more accentuated without these changes. Natural growth of the population followed the patterns noticed at national level. There was a sharp decline of the fertility following 1989 and in 2016 the total fertility rate of Burgas (1,4) was below the natural average (1,5). The process of ageing was also characteristic, in 2016 37% of the population being above 50 years of age. However, compared to Bulgaria as a whole the population of Burgas is younger and this is why the negative natural growth was relatively moderate (3387 between 1991 and 2016).

The approximately 5% population decline is also moderate compared to the national average (18% between 1990 and 2017). Migratory patterns in Burgas are relatively balanced and those going abroad and to Sofia (primarily to study) are "substituted" by internal migrants from the southern-Bulgarian mainland. As mentioned already, in Burgas tourism and construction industry are the most dynamic sectors. This changed the migratory patterns that might have been observed during state socialism and led to the emergence of seasonal internal migration. During the last years it is a tendency of internal migrants to settle down, even if job opportunities are only seasonal:

> *"Traditionally young people from Jambol, Sliven and other towns are coming to work for the summer in the resorts. Recently more and more of them are settling here even if they cannot find permanent jobs."*
>
> (Deputy Mayor of Burgas)

International migration is also relatively balanced, even if official figures obviously underestimate the outflows. As the Bulgarian LSQA emphasized, Bulgaria (and countries of the labor frontier in general) are perceived exclusively as sending territories. In case of small towns like Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanjiža inflows are really insignificant. However, Burgas is one of the destinations of third country immigrants in Bulgaria. Similarly to Bulgaria as a whole, in Burgas the main sending countries are the former Soviet Republics, most importantly Russia and Ukraine but also Kazakhstan. In 2016 738 non-EU migrants entered to the municipality, 442 were from the Russia Federation, 161 were from Ukraine and 65 from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan immigrants are also ethnic Russians and pertain to the Russian immigrant community.

Similarly to Romania and Serbia, Bulgaria is a society where each stratum is affected by large scale emigration. However, it seems that there is a difference in destination countries by social position. At the level of Bulgaria Germany, Spain, the United Kingdom and Greece were the most important countries of destination. The LSQA in Burgas focused mainly on the migration of high status and highly educated youngsters, who target primarily universities and the primary sector of the labor market in Germany and United Kingdom. In parallel with their migration lowly skilled and lower status youngsters also migrate and they are who target the secondary labor market (construction industry, agriculture) of Greece and Spain.

Sfântu Gheorghe, the seat of the smallest county in Romania (Covasna/Kovászna), might be considered as a main county level pole. It had 56,000

inhabitants in 2011. It is the headquarters of county level administration and its relatively strong secondary educational system also deserves a country-wide clientele. There were attempts to build up a tertiary level educational structure in the town. Romania's largest university, the Babeș-Bolyai University of Cluj established a faculty of public administration here, while Sapientia, a private university financed by the Hungarian (kin)state opened a study line in agrarian studies. However, this process was not particularly successful and did not transform the town in a center of tertiary education. Until 1968 the town was not among major recipients of industrial investments and industrialization begun only after the territorial reorganization of the country (1968, when the present counties were established). This was also a period of intensive population growth and the county reached its maximum population size in 1989 with 70,000 inhabitants. Following the regime change de-industrialization was an important process but it did not lead to a total collapse of the industrial production. Today processing industry is the motor of the local economy, with almost 40 percent of the employees being engaged in this domain. In the processing industry the most significant employers are in the domain of fabrication of electric and electronic equipment for cars and for car engines, textile and food industries. Currently there is a growing trend of machinery industry (car equipment and engines) which offers higher wages compared to the low value added sectors of textile industry. Recently, these letter sectors should confront growing shortage of the labor force.

The municipality of Kanjiža had 25,343 inhabitants according to the 2011 census. However, the municipality is composed of 13 settlements, the administrative center of the municipality, the tiny town on Kanjiža, having only slightly more than 9,000 residents. The town has a relatively developed community infrastructure with kindergartens, primary and secondary schools, medical center and several cultural institutions. Nevertheless, this institutional network does not serve a clientele outside the administrative borders of the municipality. Until recently, the municipality had a balanced economic structure based on agricultural production on the one hand and important industrial facilities on the other. Among the most important factories those producing construction materials (roof tile, isolation) should be mentioned. These factories used to be the most important employers of the local population. A process of privatization has begun in 2001, following the fall of the Milošević regime. The process lasted in massive reduction of the employees, causing a rather high level of unemployment and crisis of local economy. One should also mention that both

Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanjiža are located in regions inhabited in majority by ethnic Hungarians (or minority-majority enclaves– as Stroschein (2001) called them).[12] As we will see, this fact has far reaching consequences both on migratory processes and interpretative frameworks of migration.

3.7. Depopulating small towns of the labor frontier

In case of Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanjiža it is practically impossible to reconstruct exactly the population processes of the last two and half decades. A telling example is that according to the Covasna Country Directorate of the National Institute of Statistics (INS) the population of Sfântu Gheorghe was of 65,118 in 1 January, 2016,[13] 10,000 more that it was registered by the 2011 census. In what follows, we will rely on census figures and on statistics concerning natural growth to provide some quantitative estimation on population and migratory processes.

Table 4 reconstructs population processes for the inter-census periods accepting that census figures, vital statistics and figures concerning internal migration provided by the statistical offices as reliable. Census figures certainly estimate resident population more precisely compared to the population register. Nevertheless, censuses also overestimate population size. As already mentioned, both municipalities are populated overwhelmingly by Hungarian ethnics. Hungarian parties and civic organizations run in both Serbia and Romania strong census identity campaigns and suggested to the minority group members to register family members residing abroad as only temporarily absent. Among Hungarians in Serbia there was a widespread fear that empty houses might be confiscated by the state and might be given Serbian refugees from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. These were strong incentives to over-report resident populations. In case of Romania the methodology of the 2011 census was considered problematic by experts (Gheț̆au 2012). It was designed as a traditional paper and pencil based census with face to face investigation. According the preliminary results, 54,000 inhabitants were registered in Sfântu Gheorghe (while Romania's population was slightly more than 19 million). Later 1.2 million people were added at national level

[12] Sfântu Gheorghe belongs to the Hungarian majority ethno-historical region of Székely Land, while Kanjiža is situated in the Hungarian ethnic block area on the west bank of the river Tisza.

[13] http://www.covasna.insse.ro/produse-si-servicii/statistici-judetene/populatia/populatie-la-1-ianuarie/

and 2000 at the level of Sfântu Gheorghe to the census database from the population register, according to a methodology similar to register based censuses.

Table 4

Estimated population processes in Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanjiža

Type of data	*Period*	*Kanjiža*	*Sfântu Gheorghe*
Census figures	1991/1992[a]	30,668	68,359
	2001/2002[a]	27,510	61,543
	2011	25,343	56,006
Population change (%)	***1991/1992–2011***	***–17.4%***	***–18.1%***
Natural growth	1991/1992–2001/2002	–1882	1047
	2001/2002–2011	–2193	972
Net internal migration	1991/1992–2001/2002	188	–553
	2001/2002–2011	233	–821
Estimated net internal migration	1991/1992–2001/2002	–1464	–7310
		–207	–5688

[a] In Romania censuses were held in 1992 and 2002, while in Serbia in 1991 and 2001

Anyway, according to census figures there was a significant population decline of nearly 20% in both municipalities. There is a significant difference with regard to processes of natural growth. In Northern Bačka fertility rates were well below the level needed for simple reproduction already in the 1960s (Mirnics 2000; Badis 2012) and consequently the ageing of the population took place earlier and was more pronounced. Today the mean age of the population is of 43.2 years exceeding the Serbian average. Under these circumstances negative natural growth and ageing are major factors conducting to population decline. The number of deaths exceeded the number of newborns with 1882 in the first and with 2193 in the second inter-census period. In Sfântu Gheorghe the population was relatively young in the early 1990s, in 1992 the average

age being of 32.4 years. This was due to high rates of fertility during the former regime and to the influx of young internal migrant in the period between 1968 and 1992 (in 1968 the population of the town was of only 22,000, meaning that it tripled in the above mentioned period). Due to its relatively young population, natural growth was slightly positive even in the time period between 1992 and 2011 (with a fertility rate below the reproductive level but above that of Kanjiža).

According to official figures, the balance of internal migratory flows was slightly negative in Sfântu Gheorghe, while slightly positive in Kanjiža. In case of Sfântu Gheorghe relatively significant inflows and outflows are beyond these figures. According the study elaborated by the World Bank (2017) the town is a county level growth pole having some twenty rural municipalities in its area of attraction. Many people from nearby villages commute to Sfântu Gheorghe and for some young people living in these villages the town is an attractive place of residence. Next to them people (mostly elderly) from Brașov reside in the town in significant numbers and some young people from the nearby countries (Harghita, Mureș) also settle here. All in all, more than 20,000 people resided in Sfântu Gheorghe between 1992 and 2011. However, out-fluxes were even more significant and during the same period more than 21,300 people left the town for internal destinations.

According to the estimation based on census figures, natural growth and net internal migration, the balance of international migration might be of –13,000 for the two inter-census periods. International immigration in the town is insignificant. According to census results, the proportion of foreign born population is lower than 1 percent, the most important "country of origin" being Hungary. As for the destination countries of emigrants (next to the above mentioned survey) the 2011 census might be cited. It reported a emigrant stock of 2941 persons, which is far lower than the "real" figures but might be used to map the receiving areas. Hungary was at the top of destination countries, with 56% of the registered (long and short term) emigrants living there. United Kingdom was the second most important destination, with 20% percent of the migrant stock living there. Next to these countries Germany, Italy and Spain and Israel also figured as important destination for people in Sfântu Gheorghe. In countries of destination for internal migration there is also an important ethnic difference. Hungary is obviously more attractive to members of the Hungarian minority, however they are also over-represented among those opting for the United Kingdom. Ethnic Romanians tended to migrate toward Italy and Spain.

In case of Kanjiža migration statistics are even less reliable. According to them, the town might be characterized by a slightly positive balance of internal migration. The (internal) fluctuation of the population is less characteristic compared to Sfântu Gheorghe. Kanjiža is a predominantly rural municipality (even if with urban status), while the area of attraction of the tiny town of Kanjiža does not exceed the borders of the municipality. Nevertheless, two well distinguishable waves of inflows might be delimited. The first one is that of refugees of the Balkan wars. As mentioned already, the proportion of foreign born population at national level has risen to 11%. Kanjiža was not among municipalities receiving large numbers of refugees,[14] however, 712 refugees settled in this municipality too, 90% of them from Croatia and 10% from Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second well distinguishable group is that of Roma (Askali) from Kosovo. This further group can be found in Martonoš, a village belonging to the municipality.

According to estimates based on census figures, negative net migration was of 1464 in the period between 1991 and 2001 and 207 in the period between 2002 and 2011. These figures, however, obviously underestimate outflows. The 2011 Serbian census also registered persons living abroad. In Kanjiža 566 such persons were registered: the most important countries of residence were Hungary, Germany Switzerland, Austria, and Slovenia. According to the analysis of Gábrity Molnár (2008), the following types of international migration are distinguishable from Vojvodina; partially along the Vojvodina – Hungary migration nexus:

- 'Guest workers' who emigrated to West European countries and return home only occasionally, 2–3 times per year.
- Entrepreneurs, businessmen who have either already emigrated or try to benefit from cross-border economic opportunities.
- Emigration of the unemployed people whose estimated number, including their families, was higher than 10,000 in 2008.
- Cross-border commuters who live near the state border and commute on a daily or weekly basis between their Serbian place of residence and their school or workplace in Hungary, first of all in Szeged. In 2010 about 1,400 young people, a half of the Hungarian students in Vojvodina, were studying in Hungary. Their number has grown significantly since 2011, the possibility of acquiring Hungarian citizenship too (Ágyas and Sárcsevity 2018).

[14] In Voivodina the largest concentration of refugees might be found in and around Novi Sad (Tátrai et al. 2013: 43).

3.8. Partial summary

To sum, one should distinguish between different positions at the internal settlement hierarchy of the investigated municipalities. We classified Maribor, Graz, Burgas and Szeged as main regional poles, with populations between 150 and 300 thousand. We put Bratislava-Rača in this category too, however, it is obvious that it would be a mistake to interpret its demographic development without taking into account that it belongs to the Slovak capital. Kanjiža and Sfântu Gheorghe are obviously not among the main regional poles of their countries. In spite of the existing differences between them we classified both of them as zonal urban centers.

Table 5

Internal and transnational developmental positions

		Internal developmental position of the municipality	
		Zonal urban centers	***Main regional poles***
Regional developmental position of the country	***Semi-periphery (labor frontier, countries of emigration)***	Kanjiža, Sfântu Gheorghe	Burgas
	Semi-core (restructuring core, countries of both emigration and immigration)		Bratislava-Rača, Szeged, Maribor
	Core (countries of immigration)		Graz

As for the regional developmental positions of the countries, we distinguished between four types. Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia should be considered as being part of the labor frontiers deserving the Western European core. These countries were characterized as having a semi-peripheral position by Bohle and Greskovits (2012) with a strong emphasis of low value added industries. One should also emphasize that – particularly in Serbia and Romania – subsistence agriculture should be considered as important. In the typology provided by Fassmann et al. (2014) these countries enter into the category of emigration countries where no sign of taking into immigration country can be discovered. Slovenia, Hungary and Slovakia have the characteristics of semi-core econo-

mies and some parts of these countries (Western Slovakia, North-Western and Central parts of Hungary, and the area surrounding Ljubljana) are integrated in the industrial production of the Western core. They also send emigrants to Western Europe; however, in far lower number than countries belonging to the first category. As these countries – more precisely some regions in these countries – face labor shortage, theoretically they might become countries of immigration on short run. This latter aspect was emphasized also by Fassmann et al. (2014). However, as we will argue, this cannot be perceived as a consequence of an automatic process of "adaptation" to demographic challenges. Austria might be considered as part of the Western European core and as such it has a unique position among our countries. It has a positive net migration and receives an important number of immigrants. As Fassmann and Reeger (2012) emphasized it turned from emigration to immigration country well before the fall of the Iron Curtain.

4. Imagined hierarchies and migration: Perceptions of developmental positions and prospects

In the upcoming chapters of our paper we will rely on qualitative research and we will present the perceptions of local stakeholders on development and migratory processes. First, we will present the perceptions of development. Second, we will turn toward general discursive framework orienting migration policies. Third, we will present the narrative constructions through which young migrants communicate their migratory experiences.

4.1. Competing perceptions of development

In social sciences there are several paradigms or general theories concerning social development. Perhaps the most influential one is still the functionary-evolutionist theory of social modernization. This is closely connected to what Arland Thornton (2005) called developmental idealism (DI). DI has many common characteristics with functionalist-evolutionary theories of social modernization; however, Thornton does not define it as a scientific paradigm (which might or might not be valid) but as a cultural model (which might or might not be accepted by different groups of people). DI as a cultural model (meaning a set of values, beliefs and moral principles) lays at the foundation of some influential transnational organizations, among others European Union, the United Nation's Developmental Program (UNDP), the World Bank, to mention only the most important ones (Thornton et al. 2015). Further, there is considerable empirical evidence (both qualitative and quantitative) that peo-

ple around the world share (at least some) elements of modernization theories and DI.[15]

In their recent paper Thornton et al. (2017) argue that it worth investigating the acceptance of other models (paradigms) of social development too. World system theory (Wallerstein 1979; Chirot 1977) and the clash of civilizations approach (Huntington 1996) are in many respects in odds with modernization theories and DI. According to the authors, these paradigms also enjoy some prestige outside the academic circles (even if this is not comparable with that enjoyed by DI) and their presumptions might be shared by many people. Both paradigms might be perceived as critical reactions (and alternative discourses) to different aspects of DI. Thornton et al. (2017: 103–107) emphasize that the three paradigms presume a different nexus between development and morality. According to modernization theories, there is a positive nexus between development and morality, meaning that the spread of modernization (which occurs through diffusion and contact with developed societies) leads to more social justice (equality, freedom, democracy etc.) both at global and local scale. World system theories reject these presumptions and emphasize that relations and exchanges between more and less developed countries (between core and periphery) are unequal and conductive to the maintenance and increase of inequalities. In this sense, the relation between development and morality is mostly negative. The "clash of civilizations" approach denies the Universalist characteristics of modernization theories and DI. Modernization theories were also heavily criticized due to their Euro-centric flavor and they, indeed, summarize and theorize Western European and American experiences. However, according to modernization theories and DI, development is a universal process, all societies go through essentially similar pathways and all societies are capable of development. The "clash of civilization" approach openly denies these aspects and emphasizes that what is pretended to be universally attainable development by modernization theorists is in fact a unique process characterizing Western civilization. Consequently, countries outside this civilization cannot and should not follow the Western model of development and might construct the development-morality nexus in different ways. For instance, outside the Western civilization technical and infrastructural development combined with economic growth is not necessarily linked to more democracy, individualism

[15] See Binstock-Thornton (2007); Thornton-Binstock-Ghimire (2008); Thornton et al. (2012). As for our region see Melegh et al. (2010); Csánó (2010); Melegh et al. (2016); Kiss (2017).

and gender equality. From a Western perspective, adepts of the "clash of civilizations" approach might emphasize that some (regional, ethnic, religious) groups are culturally incapable of (Western type) development, meaning even that they cannot be integrated into Western societies, or Western type transnational structures.[16] From the perspective of peripheral elites the "clash of civilizations" approach might also provide a meaningful tool of criticizing DI. They may stress for instance that DI is a form of cultural penetration through which Westerners enforce their interests and weaken the capacity of the autochthonous civilization to resist.

In what follows, we will investigate empirically the acceptance of different aspects of DI and of its alternatives. One might argue that this topic is a rather actual one in the Danube region. Modernization was a major constitutive element of the state-socialist ideology. Arnason (1993; 2000) characterized state-socialism as a distinctive type of modernity competing the dominant Western pattern, while according to Böröcz (2010; 2015: 6–7) it was a systematic attempt to isolate Eastern European societies form the structure of global economy and the subsequent logic of unequal exchanges. Following the collapse of state socialism, a new consensus on developmental pathways has appeared that was based mainly on the uncritical acceptance of Western type social development perceived as a unitary model. A modernizing consensus (Kiss 2010; Sebők 2016) and the acceptance of DI were at the very core of the ideology of regime change and profoundly oriented policies until recently. The vision of development as "Europeanization" was also fueled by the conditionality of EU accession, through which former Eastern Bloc states had to go through a sequence of institutional and legal reforms in order to join the European Union. However, following the EU accession, political and cultural consensus concerning developmental pathways has vanished and elements of DI have become targets of vehement political critique. One might also underscore that migration and population policies are also in the focus of this critique. This will be, however, discussed in the next chapter of our working paper.

[16] Huntington (1993; 1996), as a scholar of international relations, emphasized this latter aspect arguing that transnational cooperation can be successful only if it does not transcend civilizational boundaries.

4.2. Operationalization: developmental idealism and its alternatives

Previous research has demonstrated that some elements of the developmental thinking are widely shared by ordinary people in South Eastern Europe.[17] First, they rather take for granted the idea that developmental hierarchies exist and that countries and regions can be ranked according to their level of advancement. Second, with some notable exceptions, they perceive developmental hierarchies rather similar to representations distributed by transnational organizations and global elites, meaning that people's rankings closely correlate with those based on GDP per capita or Human Development Index (HDI).[18]

In this investigation we tried to go further and to map some deeper layers of the developmental perceptions of local stakeholders and young migrants and to link them to general frameworks through which they interpret migratory processes. In the stakeholder interviews we dedicated an entire block to the perceptions of development:

- We asked our interviewees to provide a short overview of how the local community has been developing in the last few years.
- We asked them to characterize their own country in terms of development compared to other Danube region countries.
- We asked to talk about the developmental differences between Germany and their own country and to reflect whether these differences have widened or narrowed since the Eastern enlargement of the EU.
- Another question referred to their future expectation, whether they expect developmental differences (vis-á-vis Germany) to narrow or to widen in the upcoming years.
- We asked them to reflect over the factors helping and hindering development.
- The last question referred to the migration-development nexus and to their expectations of weather the municipality will receive immigrants and send emigrants in the future.

[17] Surveys concerning the developmental perceptions of several countries were conducted in Bulgaria (Melegh et al 2010), Hungary (Csánó 2010; Melegh et al 2016) and Romania Kiss (2017).

[18] The first exception was that they "overrated" strong economic and geopolitical actors (with relatively low GDP per capita) such as China and Russia. The second tendency was that in case of Bulgaria (and to a lesser extent in case of Romania) people underrated their own country. This aspect will be discussed later.

In case of young migrants we tried to map perceptions of developmental differences through analyzing both their spontaneous narratives (as open ended questions). We also had the following structured questions:

- We asked our interlocutors to compare their native and receiving countries, to talk about differences, about attractive and less attractive things in both countries.
- To reflect whether developmental differences between their native and receiving country will narrow or will widen in the upcoming years and whether "catching up" is likely or it is unlikely.

In what follows, we will discuss our results in six points, namely (1) how different actors perceive developmental hierarchies and the position of their country and municipality in it?; (2) how they perceive developmental trajectories, particularly how they evaluate state socialism and market transition; (3) how they evaluate future developmental prospects and the possibility of catching up; (4) which dimensions of the process of development are emphasize, do they perceive some elements of the local culture as incompatible with development?; (5) how they perceive global-transnational relations and relations with organizations dominated by core-actors?; (6) what kind of criticism of core and transnational actors exists? The perceptions of the development-migration nexus will be discussed in a separate subchapter.

Table 6 anticipates our most important results. In what follows we will discuss how these elements relate to each other in the framework of developmental idealism, providing the (often implicit) ideology and cultural foundation of the European Union and other transnational organizations. We also discuss how world system theory and the "clash of civilization" approach criticize the DI framework.

Table 6

Dominant perceptions of developmental hierarchies and prospects of local stakeholders by municipality

Municipality	Developmental hierarchies and positions	Developmental pathways		Institutional vs. cultural aspects	Relations with core and transnational actors	
		Historical trajectories	Future prospects		Diffusion vs. penetration	Forms of criticism
Kanjiža	Bottom (both internally and regionally)	Decline since 1989; strong "Yugo" nostalgia	Catching up is unlikely	Institutional aspects hinder development, local culture mostly compatible, but some elements should change	Ambivalent: both penetration and diffusion	Critique of market capitalism; Euro-optimism
Sfântu Gheorghe	Bottom (both internally and regionally)	Mainly decline since 1989; with some advance at national level	Catching up is unlikely	Emphasis on institutional elements; local culture compatible with development	Penetration	Elaborated critique
Burgas	Bottom of regional, top of internal hierarchy	Ambiguous development;	Catching up is unlikely	Strong emphasis on local culture that is perceived incompatible with development	Diffusion	Enthusiasm and adoration, lack of criticism
Szeged	Middle position of Hungary, relatively advantageous position of Szeged	Ambiguous development and uncertain prospects of catching up	Catching up is uncertain	More emphasis on institutional elements; local culture compatible with development	Ambivalent	In case of EU positive evaluation dominates

Municipality	Developmental hierarchies and positions	Developmental pathways		Institutional vs. cultural aspects	Relations with core and transnational actors	
		Historical trajectories	Future prospects		Diffusion vs. penetration	Forms of criticism
Maribor	Middle position of Slovenia, difficulties in Maribor	Decline at local level, no "Yugo" nostalgia	Catching up of Slovenia is likely but perspectives of Maribor uncertain	Emphasis on institutional elements and economy	Not discussed in details but mostly diffusion	Positive evaluation dominates
Bratislava Rača	Middle position of Slovakia, top position of Bratislava	Narrowing gap, successful development	Catching up is likely	Emphasis on institutional elements and economy	Not discussed in details but mostly diffusion	Positive evaluation dominates
Graz	Relational: above Danube region countries but below Vienna	Successful development	No need for catching up	Economic aspects are emphasized; cultural traits of some migrant groups considered incompatible with development	Not discussed in details but mostly diffusion	Positive evaluation dominates

Table 6 anticipates our most important results. In what follows we will discuss how these elements relate to each other in the framework of developmental idealism, providing the (often implicit) ideology and cultural foundation of the European Union and other transnational organizations. We also discuss how world system theory and the "clash of civilization" approach criticize the DI framework.

4.3. Perceptions of developmental hierarchies and positions

One should emphasize that the acceptance of the developmental paradigm and of the idea of developmental hierarchies seems quite widespread both among local stakeholders and young migrants and does not depend on the developmental position of the municipality. It is also important that the perception of developmental positions of the municipality and of the country does not differ significantly compared to our a priori categorization. One might argue that stakeholders and people are "aware" and "recognize" the developmental position of their countries and municipalities; however, as we will see, the map of the mental hierarchies drawn by them is more complex than this simple picture would suggest.

In both Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanjiža there is a pronounced feeling of being in a disadvantageous position, which is true even concerning the internal developmental hierarchy. In the case of Sfântu Gheorghe, the nearby city of Brașov is an important point of reference. It was a widespread argument and a source of distress that compared to Brașov Sfântu Gheorghe is only a second echelon urban center.

> *"The territory and the population of Sfântu Gheorghe are nearly identical with that of Petroșani [a mining town lying in the notoriously depressive area of Valea Jiului]. The difference is that Sfântu Gheorghe is a county seat. But why should we be proud? Do we have a development that would make a difference compared to other counties or towns? Not at all! The average income in Brașov is double compared to Sfântu Gheorghe. I think that we stew in our own juice when we think great think about ourselves"* (expert, university teacher in Sfântu Gheorghe)

In case of Kanjiža the perception of being at periphery was more pronounced and it even led to depressive feelings. Kanjiža was called a town of silence by its own mayor, where everything has stopped:

> *"One cannot wash this image. Kanjiža is the town of the silence... You have the feeling that everything has stopped."* (Mayor of Kanjiža)

In case of Kanjiža the main points of reference was the nearby Subotica, which was considered the most important center of the region. Senta and Ada were also important points of reference.

One should also emphasize that in case of both Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanjiža political elites elaborated strong compensatory narratives, through which they tried to emphasize that even if the municipalities were less developed in conventional (meaning meanly economic[19]) terms, they might have more advantageous positions if alternative hierarchies were used. In these alternative hierarchies or counter-discourses being some kind of cultural center and having a developed communal infrastructure plays a crucial role:

> *"Nine years ago, I said that I do not want Sfântu Gheorghe to be a large town. It was not a goal to create a town of 80,000 inhabitants out of the present 55,000. The goal was to create a comfortable town, to offer cultural, leisure and sport facilities. I want Sfântu Gheorghe to be a town of the families who want to raise two, three or four children and I want to create the conditions for that. I would like to transform Sfântu Gheorghe into a town of middle class families who want and assume to have children."*
> (Mayor of Sfântu Gheorghe)

The distinction between "cultural aspects" and economic development seems to be important in both Kanjiža and Sfântu Gheorghe. In Sfântu Gheorghe it was emphasized that the municipality spent the highest proportion of its expenditures spent on cultural activities among all the municipalities in Romania. Kanjiža was said to be a major cultural center for the Hungarian minority. In Kanjiža an alternative hierarchy based on the "level of civilization" (also opposed to the level of economic development was also present) was also presented. According to this discourse, Kanjiža even (if poor and peripheral) is more civilized, European and has a more developed communal infrastructure that any other municipality in Serbia.

> *"Kanjiža is a forerunner concerning the European norms and standards. Social care, health infrastructure, culture, civilization, communal infrastructure, public education, perhaps even public transport and the con-*

[19] See Melegh et al. (2016) on how Hungarians and Romanians conceptualized the notion of development, putting a strong emphasis on economic aspects..

nected infrastructure... In Serbia there are few municipalities where the sewage and the plumbing are resolved and where there is a rescue service functioning in 24 hours a day... there are few municipalities where all kinds of cultural institutions and a large array of programs could be found. Yesterday, I was noticed that we received the flag of the European Union. We were the first municipality to receive the flag. This is an award and the municipality received it because it is the most European municipality in Serbia." (Mayor of Kanjiža)

The perception that the locality has a disadvantageous position in the internal settlement hierarchy was completed by putting Romania and Serbia at lower levels of development, even if in some cases the even lower positions of some countries was emphasized (as these latter countries did not constitute major points of reference for the interviewees).

"Following entering the EU? It does not matter whether [developmental differences between Romania and Western states] have widened or narrowed. It is simply irrelevant, as far as differences are wide enough for people to leave the country. And differences are wide enough. Consequently, people leave the country" (Mayor of Sfântu Gheorghe)

"Economically speaking Serbia values nothing. It produces nothing. There is not one such a poor gang in Europe like us. We are at the bottom." (School director, Kanjiža)

"We[Serbia] are the least developed. It is even less developed compared to Romania or Bulgaria." (social worker, Kanjiža)

"I travel a lot and I obviously see that Slovenia, Austria, Czechia, Hungary and Poland are above us. But when we arrive to our region, this is no more obvious. It is not obvious that Croatia is above us. I would say that we are at the same level. Then comes the Bulgarian-Romanian tandem. I don't know... And I would locate Moldova next to them. Then we are going down the slope: Ukraine, Bosnia, Albania. And then comes Macedonia. God knows how deep they figure..." (entrepreneur, Kanjiža)

In case of Burgas there was an inherent ambiguity concerning the developmental positions of the city. All our interlocutors (the interviewed stakeholders) emphasized that Burgas is a leading developmental pole and an important regional center of south-eastern Bulgaria and, as such, it is more developed compared to other parts of Bulgaria. They also emphasized that in terms of economic and social development, Burgas is well positioned geographically. It has a favorable geostrategic location, fine seacoast and this is completed with modern infrastructure and considerable human potential, which are prerequisites for economic prosperity. It is due to this favorable location that Burgas became one of Bulgaria's most important touristic destinations and the most important naval port of the country.

However, in Burgas – in many respects similarly to Kanjiža and Sfântu Gheorghe – a dichotomy was set between the development in terms of communal infrastructure on the one hand and economic development on the other.

> *"In the last few years the local community has been developing quite vigorously and this is recognized nationwide. Burgas is considered by and large one of the best developing towns in Bulgaria. This is certainly true in terms of public infrastructure, but the local economy still does not offer enough opportunities."* (Vice-mayor of Burgas)

Almost all institutional actors emphasized the weakness of local economy (while in fact economic growth and prosperity were considered the most important aspects of development). In their view, development depends almost entirely on the active developmental policies of the local administration relying on accessible EU funds:

> *"The driving force of the development was not the business, but the state and the municipality. The massive investment in infrastructure transformed the town and created favorable conditions for economic growth. However, the expected economic invigoration did not take place."* (vice mayor, Burgas)

> *"Burgas is undoubtedly among the best developing municipalities, but this is due exclusively to the effort so of the mayor and his team. The local businesses are still in debt to the community. We are lucky to have this mayor, who managed to utilize to the full the potential of the EU*

funding. But they are the businesses who need to build on these achievements and to bring prosperity for the community." (representative of Free University of Burgas)

Economic prosperity and growth was obviously considered the most important aspect of development by our interviewees in Burgas too. In this sense, infrastructural development led by local administration is vulnerable and artificial. It is a widespread opinion that the city did not regain its balanced economic structure lost during the process of deindustrialization.

"Until tourism is the driving force of the local economy, the development will linger. We cannot expect development with three months of seasonal employment. Tourism is exhausted and the problem is that nothing new comes to replace it." (Local political actor, Burgas)

"There is some progress in the material infrastructure, but the community is still in survival mode, not in developmental. The infrastructure is important, but there is no business environment. The economy of town like Burgas cannot rely upon several months of low budget tourism." (Labor Force Office, Burgas)

This ambivalent evaluation of the developmental position of the municipality was completed with a rather negative evaluation of Bulgaria. Some of our interviewees emphasized that some progress took place at national level too, but they all positioned Bulgaria essentially at the lower end of the developmental hierarchy.

"It is not surprising that young people would be tempted to migrate to more prosperous countries… Among the Danube countries only Serbia is lagging behind Bulgaria because it is not part of EU." (vice mayor, Burgas)

"Bulgaria is still lagging behind other Danube countries except for Serbia and may be Romania. Unfortunately even Romania is doing better than Bulgaria in some respects." (headmaster of language school, Burgas)

"Traditionally Bulgaria is lagging behind the central European countries. If we are currently better off than Serbia, it is not because of our merits, but rather because of Serbia's faults – the war in Yugoslavia that left Serbia outside EU." (Labor Force Office, Burgas)

"We are at the bottom, may be in Serbia it is worse, but only a little worse than here. This is why Germany is the European dream for young Bulgarians. The epitome of prosperity, high standard of living and predictability" (young migrant, Burgas)

The centralization of the decisional structures was a common critique among stakeholders in Sfântu Gheorghe, Kanijža and Burgas. In case of the Hungarian majority towns of Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanijža centralization was also closely associated with nationalizing policies targeting the minority community.[20] Nevertheless, the critique of centralized structures played the most important role in Maribor. Trček (2014: 174) emphasized that the opposition between Ljubljana and Maribor is an important element of Slovenian (regional) identities. The relation between the two cities is strongly antagonistic and relies on a process of regional stereotyping and Othering. In the eyes of those from Maribor "froggies"[21] exploit them, while according to those from Ljubljana Maribor is backward, not competitive and competent enough. Under these circumstances it is surprising that critiques of the central government (meaning Ljubljana) and of the centralized bureaucratic structure was common among stakeholders in Maribor. They considered centralization and the monopolization of decisional competencies and resources one of the most important factors hindering development. This aspect shaped profoundly discourses concerning development, the opinions ranging from a moderate regionalism against centralization to openly separatist voices.

The administrative reforms of the 1990s were also heavily criticized by local stakeholders. The current administrative division dates back to 1998, when 212 municipalities were created instead of the then existing 60. Today the territory that in 1980 constituted the Municipality of Maribor is divided into 12 municipalities. It is a common view in Maribor that the administrative reform (even if

[20] See Csergő (2013) on this dynamics when in case of minority actors decentralization represents an alternative for claims for ethnic autonomy, while majority actors perceive it as a threat for national sovereignty and "ownership" over state institutions.

[21] Froggie is a pejorative term used for Ljubljana residents by those from Maribor.

seemingly striving for decentralization) led to more centralization and increasing influence of Ljubljana. The small municipalities can barely be considered financially independent, consequently, the administrative reform led to a dependency on governmental funds. Another common critique was that neither deconcentrating of national level institutional structure has occurred. Only one, structure, namely the National Post Office, has its headquarters in Maribor, while all other organs reside in Ljubljana. Maribor is the center of Podravska, one of the 12 statistical regions of Slovenia. However, the statistical regions do not function properly and being a seat of a statistical region has little consequences.

Developmental discourses structured around decentralization and regionalism show that in Maribor the feeling of being an (internal) periphery and living "in the shadow of Ljubljana" are quite strong. In the interviews this aspect seemed to be more important than the fact that Slovenia was put on a relatively advantageous position in regional comparison (the most important points of reference being the post-Yugoslavs states of Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo). Obviously, Austria and the city of Graz were also important points of reference they being positioned clearly above Maribor and Slovenia.

Stakeholders in Szeged perceived the developmental positions of their city more positively than in the case of the above mentioned four municipalities. It seems that they succeeded to construct Szeged more successfully as a post-industrial city, dominated by tertiary education, cultural facilities and tertiary education. They wanted to present Szeged as "an innovative hub", with a great potential for high tech industries like ICT, life science and laser technologies. They also emphasized the importance of several cultural facilities and festival and positioned Szeged as a "festival city", the flagship of the festivals being the Szeged Open-Air Festival. Similarly to Maribor, tertiary education plays a pivotal role in the developmental discourses concerning Szeged. According to our stakeholders, the fact that the city is the second largest tertiary educational center in Hungary with more than 40 thousand students studying at its universities provides the city with dynamism.

In spite of this (well-constructed and plausible) developmental narrative and city-branding discourse, there were several elements mentioned by local stakeholders that place Szeged to a less advantageous in the developmental hierarchy. The first element was connected to its regional position. In Hungary there are quite robust discourses concerning regional developmental discourses. According to this discourses there is a developmental gap between Budapest

and north-western Hungary (Transdanubia) on the one hand and the rest of the country (North-Eastern Hungary, the Great Hungarian Plain, Baranya). Szeged is situated in South Eastern Hungary in Csongrád county, which is commonly considered as a less developed part of the country. Consequently, there is a widespread fear among stakeholders that Szeged, even if relatively prosperous, will not be capable of sustainable development due to its regional position and will lose its young and educated residents due to the pull of Budapest and Transdanubia.

> *"If one looks to Southern Great Plain, Szeged is the most developed settlement. However, compared to other cities in Hungary like Budapest, Győr and Székesfehérvár, Szeged is lagging behind and probably will be unable to compete with them. Generally, Western Hungary is much more developed than our region."* (local expert, Szeged)

The second element is connected to the perception of Hungary's developmental position. To use the well-known metaphor employed by Endre Ady (1900), one of the national poets of Hungarians, Hungary is represented as a "*ferry-boat country* [that] *sails from the East to the West, but more likely back to the East"*.[22] In this metaphor of the Hungarian self-representation two important elements stand together, namely the feeling of lagging behind the West on the one hand and the sense of supremacy vis-á-vis neighboring people. This further element might be even more important in case of Szeged, that was characterized by many interviewees as *"the gateway of Hungary toward Serbia and Romania"*. However, many interviewees considered that this sense of superiority is no more obvious. A city-marketing expert considered that Romania is no more lagging behind Hungary in developmental terms, while an NGO activist said that *"entrepreneurial attitude is much weaker in Hungary than in Romania and Serbia"*. What is important is that – due to the historical construction of the Hungarian identity and national self-representation – such comparisons (concluding that "even Romanians and Serbs are better-off than us") seemed to be really traumatic for our interviewees.

Discourses of stakeholders of Bratislava-Rača concerning local development are only partially comparable with those of other towns. Rača is a district of the Slovak capital and, consequently, local development cannot be under-

[22] Translation provided by Iván T. Berend (2001: 94).

stood outside the ecological structure of the city as a whole. For the interviewed stakeholders, development meant first off all an improvement of the position of Rača in the urban ecological system of Bratislava. They emphasized that Rača was once a marginal city district with a character of the vineyard area. Housing estate constructions have begun in the 1950s and this was perceived by our interlocutors as "penetration of urban life into the formerly rural area". As for them the position in the urban ecological structure matters, they emphasized the importance of transport facilities toward the town center and the fact that through the tram line it can be reached in 15 minutes. Other key areas of development were public infrastructure, public education and social care system. Stakeholders emphasized the advantageous positions of Rača in all these dimensions. There is for instance a full spectrum of educational facilities, from pre-school facilities (kindergartens, nurseries), elementary schools, high schools, secondary vocational schools of different types. Stakeholders consider that the educational infrastructure constitutes an advantage compared to neighboring settlements (some of them in Austria and Hungary) which are alternatives for young families looking for housing. Another important element of the advantageous position of Rača was that there are no low prestige residential areas or urban slums (this being closely associated with predominantly Roma neighborhoods in Slovakia).

In a larger perspective, the top position of Bratislava and its surroundings in the internal developmental hierarchy of Slovakia was taken for granted. The regional positioning of Slovakia was also quite unanimous. The rather standard answer to our question concerning development was that:

> *"Slovakia is more developed than the Balkan states, at the same level as Hungary and less developed than Germany and Austria. Czechia is also more developed compared to us."* (Labor Force Office, Bratislava-Rača)

Some of our interlocutors emphasized that the differences between Germany and Austria on the one hand and Slovakia on the other are often overestimated:

> *"Austria and Czech Republic are less attractive than some years before, there are no significant wage differences between the Bratislava region and these countries anymore. Also, the Austrian labor market is already "over-saturated"* (Mayor of Bratislava-Rača)

In the city of Graz it was difficult to ask stakeholders about their perception of the development of the city, since most of them where experts on the topic of migration. During the interviews it became clear that Graz knows about its position as arrival country within the Danube region, since a lot of job vacancies and better salaries than in most of the Danube countries exist. One interview partner was even surprised that there "are not even more people migrating from the Danube region to Graz" since the wage differentials are that high. While most of the stakeholder perceived differences between Graz and other YOUMIG partner countries mainly of economic nature, in most of the interviews with young migrants also other factors of development mentioned, such as life quality, quality of services of general interest (school, doctors), security (mostly by females) and also the factor of personal freedom. While Graz would in the context of the Danube region be seen as a core, within the Austrian context also Graz shows outmigration of young people, to other European cities in the West, as well as internally to the capital city of Vienna. Therefore development hierarchies in Graz are rather seen as a matter of scale, than being perceived in an absolute way.

To sum, virtually all of our interviewees had a refined sense of perceiving both internal and regional developmental hierarchies. These perceptions and the awareness of hierarchies shaped profoundly their self-perceptions and policy project and it seems that they constitute the major coordinate-system orienting their planning and strategic behavior.

4.4. Perceived developmental trajectories and future perceptions

Now, we turn on developmental pathways, as not only actual hierarchies but the (perceptions of) changes of these hierarchies are important. First we discuss how our interviewees evaluate historical trajectories of development and then we turn toward their future expectations.

As for the narratives concerning the developmental trajectories, there was a major difference between Austrian interviewees on the one hand and those from other (former Eastern Bloc) countries on the other. Austrian interviewees – if they reflected on historical pathways of development – constructed a story of continuous socio-economic development that began in 1945. Only few of them mentioned any historical events disturbing this continuous developmen-

tal process, the 2008 economic crisis being mentioned by some interviewees. Benefic aspects of the Eastern EU enlargement were also often emphasized. According to our interviewees, following the EU enlargement Austria and particularly Graz have gained a central position within Europe and serve as important *"gateways towards the South Eastern Europe"*. In a sense they perceived the fall of the Iron Curtain and Eastern EU enlargement as a process through which Austria and Graz regained their area of attraction (that transcends state borders and includes some parts of Slovenia for example), going beyond the national borders and comprising parts of south-eastern Europe.

In former Eastern Bloc countries an important element of the developmental narratives was discontinuity, the regime change being an important turning point. In some cases the post-Communist period was entirely characterized through decline, while the evaluation of the state socialist episode differed from case to case. These differences – together with pessimism/optimism concerning developmental prospects – might induce quite different evaluations of- and attitudes toward the dominant developmental discourse (DI).

The narrative of discontinuity and of developmental decline was the most dominant in the case of Maribor and Kanjiža, interestingly two ex-Yugoslav municipalities but in countries with quite different pathways following the disintegration of the Socialist Federation. As we saw (Figure 2 and Figure 3 concerning GDP/capita), during the 1970s both Serbia and Slovenia have gained a relatively advantageous developmental position. Serbia was hit hardly by the Yugoslav succession wars and, according the 2018 Maddison database, was not able to recover again its 1989 level of GDP per capita. Slovenia "escaped" the war with only 10 days of fighting and was perceived as the most successfully performing in the process of market transition. According to Bohle and Greskovits (2012), Slovenia constituted a distinct type of post-socialist market capitalism, namely a corporatists one (defined by more accentuated state ownership and strong role of trade unions) differing significantly from (more) neo-liberal variants. In this respect the country was considered a success story by many, including critics of neoliberalism (Kirn 2014; 2018). Nevertheless, the country was hit particularly hard by the financial crisis of 2009 and it lost from its relatively advantageous position compared to other former Eastern Bloc countries.

According to the representations of our interlocutors, the developmental history of Maribor could be divided into four periods. The first period was that of Yugoslav era, when Maribor saw a strong process of industrialization and

growth. Industrial development relied on the already existing industrial tradition and skilled labor force; however, the industrial facilities of the city attracted labor force from all over the Yugoslav federal entities. The second period was that of the 1980s, which was perceived by the interviewed stakeholders as a period of stagnation. One might notice that in 1988 (years before the collapse of Yugoslavia) the town was the side of mass demonstration of industrial workers. The 1988 protest movements were not connected to the Slovenian national movement but were pro-Yugoslav in their character and opposed measures of market-liberalization (Kirn 2014). This event was mentioned only by the representative of Serbian minority in Maribor. The 1990s constitute the third period, being characterized as one of deindustrialization and decline. The bankruptcies of the industrial firms have occurred especially in the period between 1991 and 1996. Some of the closed industrial facilities had previously employed thousands of people. Unemployment has risen considerably and reached 25 percent of the active population. The vast majority of industrial workers have become long term unemployed. During this period many people left the town and some residential areas have experienced depopulation.

In spite of pronounced narrative of decline the "Yugo" nostalgia did not characterize our interlocutors. The industrial capacities of Maribor were strongly connected to the Yugoslav market and partially to the Yugoslav military. However, our interlocutors did not blame the dissolution of the federal state (which from an economic point of view was obviously disastrous for Yugoslavia). More interviewees (belonging to the ruling political class) interpreted the industrial decline as inevitable, while the key factors of it were identified in *"protectionism, local form of self-management model with unclear ownership"* that made *"local companies unready to open market"*. A partially positive evaluation of the Yugoslav era was outline solely by the representative of the Serb minority:

> *"The situation is still worse throughout Yugoslavia than it was before the breakup, perhaps except Croatia where the situation is improving, and Slovenia, which is probably better-off than it was. But cities like Maribor constitute an exception. They went from cities with highly payed labor to cities of high unemployment. The situation was the worst during the collapse of the industrial giants of Metalna, TAM, Jeklotechna and MTT. Currently the unemployment is stagnating but those lost dear jobs in the 1990s are unemployed yet. And they are at the retirement age now.*

The city itself was declining ever since and it probably never will reach the same level as it had." (Representative of the Serbian minority)

The third period started around the turn of millennium and was ended by the financial crisis in 2009. This period was described by our interviewees as one full of optimism. One should emphasize that the interviewed political actors, experts and NGO activists have a particular perspective, namely that of "projectocracy", who were engaged during this period a re-branding of a city and constructing a new post-industrial vision and identity. In this new identity tourism, creative industries, the tertiary education and European fund should have been the main drivers of development. During this period Maribor was engaged in numerous EU funded project, the most visible one being the European Capital of Culture (in 2012) and the European Capital of Youth (in 2013). This projects backed by the local leadership gave international visibility for Maribor; however, they were not particularly successful in building either a new "post-industrial" identity or a sense of prosperity among residents. The 2012–2013 protests might be perceived as a symbolic turning point. The protests broke out due to the controversial case of a radar system operated in private-public partnership by the municipality and the firm Iskra Sistemi, which has become the symbol of the corruption and nepotism practiced by the Slovene political class (Kirn 2018). These events led to the resign of the mayor and also put an end to the "optimism" shared by the projectocrats and the political class.

In case of Kanjiža the narrative of continuous decline following the disintegration of Yugoslavia was even more accentuated. However, in this case remembering the Tito era is full of nostalgia. This period is considered unanimously as a golden age, when people might afford spendings connected to consumption patterns that are considered to be "normal" and when they were well-off compared to neighboring countries.

"Tito gave us consistent salaries. In his era we were able to go to holiday three times a year. And when we wanted, we went to Budapest to eat a fish soup. We went to the casino because the red passport [of Yugoslavia] was really valued. However, times have changed and people have changed. Today we are not at the level of Germany, not even at the level of Hungary" (entrepreneur, Kanjiža)

Contrary to the Slovene case here the model of self-management and the whole system of state socialist economic coordination have a strong positive connotation as opposed to deregulation, privatization and market capitalism. It is a common sense that the worst thing that happened to Kanjiža was the process of privatization that lasted between 2001 and 2011. During this period foreign investors bought the most successful local factories but shortly reduced their level of production or closed down the factories. Potisje, a roof tile factory employed around 40% of those engaged in the industrial sector was bought by an Italian investor, who reduced the number of employees to half in 2004. Following the process of privatization the unemployment rate was far higher than in case of Maribor. In Kanjiža there are some attempts of re-branding the city mainly as a touristic destination but these seem to be even less successful and credible than in Maribor.

The narrative focusing on discontinuity and decline was strongly present in Maribor and Sfântu Gheorghe too. The economic landscape was dominated by industry in Burgas too. Near the city operates the largest chemical and oil refinery in southeastern Europe, which used to be the major employer of the local population. In the 1970s and 1980s, when the chemical industry was on the rise, it attracted workers from all over the country and contributed to the fast growth of the population. The macro-political developments, however, had a lasting negative effect on the local economy. With the downfall of the centralized economy of the former communist state in the 1990s the city suffered considerable deindustrialization. Contrary to Maribor and Kanjiža, in Burgas a real boom of the tourism industry has occurred. However, virtually all the interviewed stakeholders considered the new post-industrial economic landscape of Burgas as unhealthy and unsustainable. Only a few new enterprises emerged to replace the old ones that were closed down. The boom of the tourist industry about the turn of the century generated short-term demand for labor force in construction (hundreds is hotels were built along the coast near Burgas), and in the seasonal jobs related to tourist services. This is why, it was a widespread opinion among local stakeholders that the local development is somehow “artificial” and sustained only by the projects and infrastructural investments of the municipality.

Remembering major historical turning points and the transition toward market economy often take the form of a decline narrative in Sfântu Gheorghe too. However nostalgic feelings concerning the state socialist past absent; even if the transition toward market economy is barely seen as a triumphant process.

In case of Bratislava-Rača developmental declines were far less accentuated and the process of market transition was seen as less problematic compared to the previous cases. Stakeholders of Bratislava-Rača also emphasized that privatization had negative consequences, as some wine factories for instance were closed down. However, as a whole, the process was considered as bringing more advantages both for the district and Bratislava. In Szeged the developmental decline was mentioned at national level.

4.5. Developmental pathways: future prospects

The interviews show that developmental optimism, an important feature of DI, is barely dominant in former Eastern Bloc countries. The only research site where it was a dominant conviction that the country and municipality will catch up and will join the club of the core countries was Bratislava-Rača.

In case of Maribor and Szeged there was a feeling that Hungary and Slovenia are lagging behind and lost their comparative advantages, even compared to neighboring Eastern Bloc countries:

> *"Once Slovenia was recognized as the most economically prosperous and developed not only among ex-Yugoslav states but throughout the whole Eastern European region. In other field it was also more developed than other countries. However, it has not kept this position. Other countries performed better and became more successful. It is still more successful than other Yugoslav republics, but only because it did not suffer the tremendous war losses as Serbia or Croatia."* (Entrepreneur, Maribor)

In case of Sfântu Gheorghe, Kanjiža and Burgas catching up seems to be an even less realistic perspective. Many interviewees perceive that developmental differences between their own country and the core (Germany) have narrowed during the last few years. However, they cannot believe that this will lead to real catching up:

> *"[Whether differences narrowed or widened] following the EU enlargement? Or whether they will narrow? I think this is not relevant. They are large enough. And now there is a possibility to go abroad. Nobody stops the people. The difference is large enough and, consequently, our people leave."* (mayor of Sfântu Gheorghe)

"The European Union will homogenize with time, but we will always remain a periphery" (politician, Burgas)

In Kanjiža we found an argumentation that Eastern European countries will catch up solely in case Germany collapses due to the crisis of immigration. However, this is barely a developmental expectation but merely a political argumentation affecting migration.

"Differences will narrow. Not because our economy will become more strong, but because Germany will collapse. They won't be able to deal with immigrants. These people do not want to speak German, these people do not want to accommodate to the German culture. They do not want to work. If the system of social welfare collapses this will affect seriously economy too." (Mayor of Kanjiža)

4.6. Development: institutional vs. cultural aspects

If developmental idealism was perceived as a culture backing the functioning of transnational organizations and developmental programs (Thornton et al. 2015) than development might also be perceived as a project of cultural re-socialization, through which traditions, habits and convictions incompatible with the functioning of the above mentioned organizations are rolled back and substituted (see Alexandrov 2007; Alexandrov-Chichek 2012 for such an interpretation). But how perceived our interviewees the relation between culture and development? Did they think that their own cultural stuff is compatible with the requirements of development? Or in order to run successful programs of development this cultural stuff should be rolled back and substituted? Our argument is that both answers are possible in the DI framework; however, they indicate radically different self-perceptions and strategies of self-positioning in the developmental hierarchy. In the first case actors think about themselves and their own society as having a cultural staff compatible with the requirement of modernity and development. In other words, they perceive themselves as sharing the "master-culture" of modernity, they are rational, enlightened and mature enough to develop successfully. Neither in this case might be successful development taken for granted; however, it does not depend on a project of cultural re-socialization but it is a matter of right policies and institutional designs. In the second case actors perceive themselves and their own society as having a cul-

tural stuff hindering development and being incompatible with the functioning of institutional structures sustaining modernity. Alexander Kiossev's (1999) notion of self-colonizing cultures might be applied here. The self-colonizing disposition means that one adores modernity (and vehemently endorses DI) but perceives its own society as incapable of development and lacking cultural stuff needed by institutions of modernity.

In the interviews we asked stakeholders about the factors hindering and helping development. The answers (together with other aspects of the interviews) revealed quite interesting and rather marked country-specific differences. Slovene, Slovak and Hungarian interviewees referred almost exclusively to institutional factors and public policies when talking about development. In the interviews conducted in Bratislava-Rača it was the following citation was similar to other answers given:

> *"[Factors hindering development are]the lack of adequate family oriented housing and poor educational policies. Low wages and high prices also hinder development. The municipality will further develop due to EU funds and good employment prospects. In our region there are quite good prospects in the labor market."* (employee of the local administration, Bratislava-Rača)

In Maribor and in Szeged too, development was more a matter of adequate policies. In Maribor stakeholders hoped for instance that the legislation targeting disadvantaged areas will help the municipality to develop. Institutional aspects dominated the discourse of interviews conducted in Romania and Serbia too. For our interviewees Austria and Germany were first of all better organized countries. However, they did not think that for Romanian or Serbian people it would create difficulties and would require a process of cultural adaptation to accommodate to this institutional-organizational environment:

> *"I also recognize that the system which is well organized, which functions as a system immediately grips you. The health care system is alright, the educational system alright; the train comes when it has to come. It does not conk out, it does not explode. These thinks motivate you to emigrate. Surely, you want the best for yourself; you want the best for your children. Living here in Serbia? It is a great challenge, you know. It is a daily challenge. You never know what will happen the next day. We are not orga-*

nizes. We do not live in a system. We live in anarchy. This requires another sort of attitude, another sort of perspective" (School director, Kanjiža)

The accounts of Bulgarian interviewees are sharply different. They consider that the institutional and organizational reforms and the contact with the institutional structures of the European Union are the major triggers of development, which is not straightforward, however, due to some hardly changeable aspects of the local (Bulgarian) culture:

"The intense exchange with the rest of the European Union pushes the country forward. However, it is difficult to establish efficient organizational structures in this culture. That's why we are losing the competition." (Vice-mayor, Burgas)

"*In some respects the developmental differences have narrowed, in others have widened. On the one hand, Bulgaria now looks more like a European country, but in the same time the cultural differences have become more obvious."* (Demographic expert, Burgas)

"Whether the country will catch up? It is difficult to say. In terms of infrastructure we are getting closer to the developed countries, but we differ in our attitudes toward work and to life. We are always complaining." (NGO activist, Burgas)

"Developmental differences might narrow. But this will take more than 5 years. It will take another generation a cultural change to take place." (Entrepreneur, Burgas)

"At the surface Bulgaria nowadays looks closer to Germany than before. At a deeper level however, Bulgaria is turning into a poor and dependent periphery of the most developed European economies. This is primarily because we cannot change our way of life, our culture." (Entrepreneur, Burgas)

"A drive forward presupposes not only economic boom, but transformation in the mentality and culture." (Director of language school, Burgas)

One should emphasize that a nexus between institutional structures and the cultural characteristics of the "local" people is inversely constructed in Bulgaria compared to all other cases. For instance, in the Bulgarian case even inadequate institutional functioning is thought in cultural terms, meaning that not structural aspects, but "the rigid Bulgarian bureaucratic culture" is blamed for shortcomings. Or the representative of the labor market office in Burgas complained because of the low quality of the Bulgarian labor force, or simply, he considered his fellow countrymen as lazy people:

> *"Bulgarian workforce cannot live up to the standards of the German employers. Judging from my observations, I don't believe that we will ever be able to compete with German workers. We always prefer to do the things in the easy way."* (Labor force office, Burgas)

These aspects sharply contrast with the Romanian or Hungarian discursive constructions of development where people own the "right" cultural stuff and shortcomings are due to badly functioning institutional structures. The following fragment, being part of an interview made with a Romanian guest worker in Bratislava-Rača reveals these important differences in self-representation:

> *"But also, as in case of that university, it was of a poor quality. I do not think that schools there [in Romania] really prepare children for professions. But Romanians are skillful and energetic people. And they are hard-working so even with bad schools they are good workers"* (Romanian guest worker in Bratislava-Rača)

In a more general sense, Bulgarians seem to share a rather paradoxical disposition. On the one hand, they are the less critical toward developmental idealism and institutional structures dominated by Western actors. On the other hand, however (and this is in sharp contrast with other Central and Eastern European people), they perceive their culture as being incompatible with development and different compared to the Western culture.

This representation of Western otherness and superiority is present in the migrant interviews too. The following fragments are part of an interview conducted with a young Bulgarian man, who – even if university graduate – worked temporarily as low skilled in construction industry in Germany. Interestingly, he constructs the Western moral superiority along the Roman Catholic tradition.

Through emphasizing the Catholicism of Germans he also stresses his own Otherness (as a Bulgarian Orthodox):

> *"I was fascinated by the beauty of Bavaria, by the way people accepted me… I was very pleasantly surprised… The people in Germany look calm and happy. They pay attention to one another, they care for others… It is not only the economic prosperity, you feel there. It is the community around. I think this has to do with the moral values, may be with the Catholic Church."* (guest worker in Germany from Burgas)

One should emphasize that the reflecting over cultural differences and habits incompatible with "development" was present in the interviews made in Serbia too. However, here – ethnically Hungarian – interviewees emphasized the cultural Otherness of their fellow countrymen living in the southern part of Serbia. In the following fragments this is stressed by referring to Novi Pazar, a Muslim majority municipality in Southern Serbia (Sandžak), respectively on the "Turkish traditions" of the Serbian administration. As people living in Southern Serbia can barely considered as part of the interviewee's relevant in group, the strategy employed by him differs from the "self-colonization" characteristic for Bulgarians.[23]

> *"It would be good if this Turkish story could be transcended. I mean kadija te pita, kadija te tuži, kadija ti sudi*[24] *... Those who were abroad, probably saw what is there. They saw how the market works, that you can buy and you can sell. Maybe he saw somewhere in Germany how a plastic window should be made and when he comes home he would say: I need a material solid background; I need a bank and the bank needs to trust me. This is quite important. Serbia does not trust its own citizens, it does not borrow them money. This is why we cannot develop. The potential is in those who learned democracy... I mean the democratic market culture. But they [the political class] do not understand this. And consequently,*

[23] Milica Hayden-Bakić (1995) called this strategy nesting Orientalism, meaning that the cultural Othering is reproduced in locally bounded social fields in order to establish internal hierarchies. The term Balkanism employed by Todorova (1997) might also be an adequate label.

[24] Serbian proverb meaning the *"kadi robs you, the kadi charges you and the kadi convicts you"*. It remained the initial Serbian, as the interview was (otherwise) conducted in Hungarian.

people won't return. A only the Russian Mafia will invest in this country" (School director, Kanjiža)

"If one goes to south there nothing is organized. But we cannot compare ourselves with them. To Novi Pazar and I don't know what. That is another world, another culture. We cannot understand them, but we neither want to understand them. They are not our problem" (political actor, Kanjiža)

In Bulgaria similar distinctions might be noticed but primarily not along regional or ethnic lines but along generational and class differences. This means that in case of young and educated (return) migrants the self-colonizing attitude goes hand in hand with an emphasis on generational and class cleavages. This young people feel that they are have the mission to transform Bulgaria, a process conducting to cultural clashes (between backward mentalities and development).

"A friend of mine came from US back to Burgas and created an eco-farm for herbs in one of the nearby villages. The local peasants offered to be her partners, she refused and they let the cattle in her fields. The harvest was ruined so she lost her investment and gave up the idea." (Young returned migrant, Burgas)

"My fellow workers were simple people from the Rodopi region[25] *and were primarily interested how much are going to earn and bring back home. They notice the differences, of course, but they would not try to explain them… They found it strange that I used my free time to travel around and visit museums."* (Guest worker in Germany from Burgas)

4.7. Diffusion vs. penetration

The next key element of developmental idealism is openness to global and transnational connections. This is connected to the conviction that contacts with the developed core and transnational structures dominated by core actors lead to a diffusion of cultural norms helping development. In an alternative

[25] A symbol of remote rural areas, which is otherwise populated by Pomaks or Bulgarian speaking Muslims.

model, adepts of world system theory perceive this relation to be conductive to cultural and social penetration of the core society and ultimately to cultural hegemony. Our question is how our interviewees perceive this relation.

The model of diffusion seemed to be obviously dominant. In Maribor, Szeged, Bratislava-Rača EU funds, policies enhancing social cohesion were often mentioned among the factors helping development, while the contacts with EU structures was perceived mainly positively. As we will see in the next chapter, immigration policies (perceived as induced by European actors) might be seen partially as an exception. In case of Burgas, Sfântu Gheorghe and Kanjiža this question was more extensively discussed by the interviewees and it seemed to have more stake for them.

In the Bulgarian case this was connected to the conviction that the local culture was incompatible with development and different compared to the culture backing transnational institutions. As mentioned already, virtually all of our Bulgarians interviewees embraced developmental idealism and evaluated the cultural change positively. Importantly, this influenced also the perception of migratory flows by the Bulgarian stakeholders. As we will see, emigration is perceived as endangering demographic reproduction of the nation. However, form a developmental point of view, migration is evaluated positively, as it leads to exchange of ideas, contact with more developed countries and ultimately to the diffusion of cultural norms sustaining development. Further, in case of EU structures not only the importance of funding was emphasized. Our Bulgarian interviewees, contrary to other CEE stakeholders, expected know-how, knowledge from these contacts.

In case of Kanijža and Sfântu Gheorghe, contacts with the developed European core were evaluated far less positively. In Kanijža EU optimism was characteristic; however, economic processes (the privatization of local industrial facilities by Western economic actors) and migratory flows were interpreted markedly in a framework of social and cultural penetration of stronger actors:

> *"This is a process of brainwashing. They transmit through all possible channels, through media, through facebook, through market. Come here, this is a party, here everything is great. And one cannot stop this process of brainwashing. And we also became dominated by these ideologies. For instance a teacher of mine had a presentation. She said that only those remained who were unable to do something. I felt myself quite badly that I am among those idiots who remained"* (Mayor of Kanjiža)

5. Situating migration and development

In what follows we will map the perceptions of the "migration-development nexus" (Nyberg-Sorensen et al. 2002). Our major question is how the interviewed stakeholders perceive the relation between migratory processes (especially youth migration) and developmental prospects of their own municipality and country. In the previous chapter we saw that developmental thinking is widely accepted and developmental hierarchies constitute a major coordinate system orienting our interviewees. The next question is whether migratory processes are also situated in this framework and if this was the case what would be the perceived effects of migration on development and *vice versa*.

5.1. Conceptual remarks

Before presenting our empirical results, we briefly discuss how different paradigms of developmental thinking (namely developmental idealism and the historical-structural approach) perceive the development-migration nexus. Then we also outline an alternative framework, namely that of "populationist" views (Joppke 2005) and demographic nationalism (Melegh 2016; Dumbrava 2017), which problematize ethno-cultural and ethno-national reproduction and focus on the cultural characteristics of the migrants. We should emphasize that – contrary to different versions of developmental thinking – we do not consider demographic nationalism a scientific framework and we do not want to argue for its validity. On the contrary, we are rather critical toward some of its forms. However, as we will see, the interviewed stakeholders often situate migration in this framework and this fact obviously orients their policy decisions.

5.1.1. Competing perceptions of the development migration nexus

Hein de Haas (2010) argued that debates concerning migration and development are deeply embedded in the opposition between more general paradigms concerning development. He distinguished between functionalist and neo-classical theories on the one hand and structuralist and neo-Marxist theories on the other (de Haas 2010: 229). As already mentioned, the first paradigm is rather close to what Thornton (2005) called developmental idealism, while the second might be identified with world system and dependency theories. As de Hein argued, adepts of the functionalist modernization theory, which following 1990 was practically merged with the neoliberal framework,[26] share basically optimistic views concerning the development-migration nexus. Neoclassical theory of migration (Todaro, 1969; Todaro-Maruszko, 1987; Borjas, 1989) not only postulates that migration is engendered by existing wage differentials but also states that it is conductive to a functional equilibrium on the labor market: while capital tends to relocate to countries with lower labor cost, worker's mobility is toward high income countries. Consequently, migration is conductive to territorially more balanced development and less inequality. Another important aspect is that – from the diffusionist perspective characterizing adepts of the modernization theory – return migrants might be considered as important agents of social change and innovation. Consequently, migration is perceived as an important factor fostering development and modernization. The next aspect stressed by de Haas (2010: 230) was that migration means a net transfer from the receiving to the sending society. First, it is a transfer of ideas and attitudes that help sending countries to develop and, second, through remittances it is a transfer of income leading to a more equal distribution of living standards. We already discussed the theory of migration cycles (Okólski 2012; Fassmann-Reeger2012) that is also embedded in developmental idealism and neo-classical theories of migration and treats the migration-development nexus from the perspective of receiving countries. As mentioned already, they argue that advanced societies should develop into countries of immigration in order to face consequences of labor shortage caused by demographic transition.

De Haas (2010: 233–241) emphasized that more pessimistic views concerning the migration-development nexus are often embedded in historical structuralist and neo-Marxist theories of dependency, unequal exchanges and

[26] In this respect see also Thornton et al. (2015: 288), who argue that elements of neo-liberalism (free market orthodoxy) have become central part of the ideology backing developmental programs during the 1980s and 1990s and remained so until today.

world-system. As mentioned already, these theories are more pessimistic concerning the developmental prospects of less advanced societies. According to them, territorial disparities are an inherent part of the capitalist world order and, once differential development has occurred, the bipolar pattern between centrum and periphery is likely to be reproduced and deepened. This leads to expectation opposing the neo-classical ones: the outflow of capital from the core regions, and the diffusion of economic activities toward peripheries is undoubtedly an ongoing process, but in parallel a constant spatial "concertation in control, ownership and profit appropriation" takes place (Sassen, 2005, p.33). Under these circumstances, the global economic growth barely results in the reduction of economic gaps, but is merely conducting to increasing returns for the core regions. Adepts of historical structuralism argue that migration processes are part of the unequal exchanges between centrum and periphery (Portes-Böröcz 1989). Through this process, the receiving society loses its most valuable working force through a process of brain drain. Further, migration along forms of cultural and ideological penetration leads a disintegration of the cultural context of the sending society, marked among others by a spread of consumer patterns characterizing core societies (but without the required material resources) and the devaluation of the existing "autochthonous" lifestyles. This context might be conductive to the so called culture of migration, meaning that young people are no more willing to build their strategies and life trajectories inside their own society but perceive migration as a normal and needed event of their life course that is conductive as such to an increase of the social status (Massey et al., 1993; Cohen 2004; Ali 2007; Horváth 2008).

In our analysis we do not want to argue for or against the validity of different theories but we want to reveal how stakeholders perceive the migration-development nexus. Further, we argue that their perceptions are shaped by their more general expectations and concepts of development on the one hand and the structural position in the spatial hierarchy on the other.

5.1.2. Developmental and "populationist" views on migration

Adepts of developmental idealism and historical structuralists have quite different expectations concerning the relation between migration and development. Nevertheless, they share a universalist perspective, and this also means that they often elaborate models where ethno-cultural differences play a secondary role. This universalist language not only dominates the scientific literature on

migration and development but it is also a strong norm framing migration policies in liberal democracies.

However, form a historical perspective, the dominance of this universalist norm and "agnosticism" regarding the cultural background cannot be taken for granted. Christian Joppke (2005) argued that "selecting by origin", meaning an explicit ethnic selection of immigrants who "fit better" to the receiving society, was rarely questioned until the 1960s in Western Europe and in European settler societies (US, Canada, Australia). He also emphasized that "populationist" perspectives were more particularistic and were more concerned about the reproduction of the nation and its dominant cultural stuff.

In the United States, for instance, the American mainstream was defined as the culture of the initial (WASP) settlers, while assimilation was perceived as a process of unilateral adaption of immigrants to this mainstream (Alba-Nee 2003). A well-known (and notorious) example is Warner's and Srole's (1945) book entitled *Social Systems of American Ethnic Groups*. The authors not only perceived assimilation as a process through which immigrants "unlearn" their cultural traits but also established a hierarchy of ethnic groups based on cultural and racial proximity-distance towards the WASP core. On the top of this hierarchy were Northern European Protestants, followed by Mediterranean Catholics in the middle and by "Negroes" at the bottom. This hierarchy of cultural and racial proximity also indicated the capacities and expected speed to assimilate into the mainstream and profoundly oriented American migration policies until the 1960s. Joppke (2005: 104–111) argued that the debate between "populationist" views focusing on the cultural proximity and capacities of immigrants to assimilate on the one hand and "economist" views looking on the economic utility of the immigrants without considering their cultural background characterized post-World War II French immigration policies too. In Germany a basically ethnic concept of the nation and a subsequent ethnically selective migration policy was characteristic until the 1990s (Brubaker 1992; Joppke 2005: 157–219). Nevertheless, following the 1960s, a process of "de-ethnicization" of the migratory and citizenship regime has taken place in both Western Europe and its overseas. This does not mean that origin, ethnic background and cultural proximity do not play an important role in the selection of immigrants.[27] However, in liberal democracies this aspect is no more taken for granted and it is considered problematic, at least by the so called mainstream actors of the

[27] For a comparative table on ethnically selective rules of naturalization see Dumbrava (2014: 52–55).

academia, media and political field. Under these circumstances, three – sometimes competing – principles are perceived as legitimate factors shaping the selection between potential immigrants, namely protection of asylum seekers (connected to the universalist framework of human rights), family reunification and the need of the labor market for certain occupational categories. This further dimension is connected to the utilitarian framework and to the discourse of the economic utility. In this framework, immigrants might be needed because of the labor force demand of certain sectors. In liberal democracies it is legitimate to select among them by "human capital", meaning educational attainment, certain skills, qualification or even language knowledge. However, in this framework it is not legitimate to select migrants by their cultural background or origin. The utilitarian perspective perceives migrants as labor force with certain skills but not as Hungarians or Kurds.

Several investigations – especially those focusing on the rise of right-wing populism – underscored that the dominance of the universalist framework in migration policy is no more taken for granted. Gary Freeman's (1995) notion of anti-populist norm might be important here. Freeman (1995: 884) emphasized that in liberal democracies there was relatively little resistance toward the liberalization of migration policies, in spite of the fact that public opinions tended to be more restrictive than officials. According to him, this was due to several factors, one of the most important among them being the so called anti-populist norm. The anti-populist norm impedes mainstream parties to use racial, ethnic, or anti-immigration arguments in order to win votes. Consequently, immigration policy remains outside the agenda of electoral campaigns and political debates. However, the rising right-wing populist parties targeted exactly this consensus, rejected the hegemony of the Universalist discourse in migration policy and brought back "populationist" arguments and concerns about the cultural background of the immigrants. They often appeal to the xenophobic feelings and cultural anxieties of the public.

Investigations focusing on our region showed that a particular form of "populationism", namely demographic nationalism is quite widespread and deeply penetrates population policies. Scholars focusing on nationalism emphasized that following the regime change states throughout Eastern Europe were redesigned as nationalizing states (Brubaker 1996; Csergő 2007). According to this concept, state institutions are owned by the titular ethnic group (Wimmer 2002) and are designed to reproduce the culture of the dominant majority (Csergő-Goldscheider 2004). It is not a surprise that in this framework

demographic nationalism, targeting the reproduction of the ethno-nation prevails and penetrates virtually all elements of population policy. The first element that scholars identified as being part of demographic nationalism was *selective pro-natalism* (Melegh 2016; Dumbrava 2017). This means that the high fertility of lower status groups (particularly of Roma) is problematized in parallel with the low fertility of higher status groups. Selective pronatalism is conductive to population policies based on incentives that facilitate the childbearing of the middle classes. The second element is constituted by migration policies that might also be subordinated to demographic nationalism and ethnic engineering. As already mentioned, during the former regime Bulgaria facilitated the emigration of Turks, while Romania sold out Germans and Jews. Following the change of the regime Baltic States actively encouraged Russians to leave the country (Laitin 1998) not mentioning cases of forced migration and ethnic cleansing in the ex-Yugoslav space. Another aspect is selective emigration and citizenship policy that has become a rule in the region (Dumbrava 2013). Among our Danube region countries Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Serbia offer extra-territorial citizenship for ethnic kin-communities living abroad. Several scholars argued that demographic rebalancing through facilitating selective migration was one of the major reasons lying beyond offering preferential citizenship for co-ethnics (Waterbury 2014; Dumbrava 2016). The last element of the – radicalizing – demographic nationalism is negative selection, e.g. the rejection of culturally and racially different groups that has become an explicit ideology in Hungary (Melegh 2016) and an implicit practice throughout Eastern Europe.

In what follows we will analyze the interviews conducted with local stakeholders from the perspective of the perception of migration-development nexus on the one hand and general frameworks orienting migration policies on the other. We will discuss three (interlinked) questions. First, we ask how they stakeholders perceive their own municipality and country in terms of immigration and emigration. Second, we try to map how they perceive the positive and negative consequences of migration. Third, we focus on varying forms of "populationism" and demographic nationalism and ask whether this perspective is able to cross-cut the Universalist perspective which – at least theoretically – orients policies and debates concerning migration in liberal democracies.

5.2. Emigration or immigration countries

As already mentioned, the investigated municipalities occupy quite different positions in the internal (intra-national) and regional spatial hierarchy of the Danube region and these differences are the major factor affecting net migration. Municipalities being in a (semi)peripheral position in both internal and international hierarchies experience negative net migration. I case of municipalities with a more central position, the number of immigrants surpasses that of emigrants. Nevertheless, being an emigration or an immigration country is also a matter of perceptions. For instance, the LSQA of Burgas (Alexandrov 2017: 17) emphasized that both Bulgaria and the municipality of Burgas are perceived exclusively as emigrants sending territories. In fact, this perception is misleading. The outflow of people, typical for the post-Communist period still continues. However, in the last decades, the city has become a receiving destination for an increasing number of immigrants. In the case of Burgas the main sending countries are Russia, Ukraine, and, somewhat surprisingly, Kazakhstan. Local stakeholders, when asked about migration, predominantly emphasized the massive and persistent emigration of young and educated Bulgarians towards Western European countries, which they perceived as a phenomenon affecting negatively the developmental prospects of the municipality. Another example is that of the Graz stakeholders, who focus almost exclusively on immigration while, in fact, large number of young people (born in Graz or outside the city) leave the municipality after they graduate.

Future expectations depend even more obviously on (subjective) self-perceptions. In this respect, migration transition (Zelinsky 1971) and migration cycles (Fassmann-Reeger 2012) theories draft rather clear expectations. If individual countries successfully develop, they will become from emigration countries targets of immigration flows. Or, if they aim to successfully develop they should become countries of immigration. Our question referred to future expectations of the stakeholders and we asked whether they can “imagine” that their municipality might receive large influx in immigrants in the future. To answer this question we rely on two additional sources, namely on interviews with stakeholders and on population projections.

As already mentioned, population projections were based on complex mathematical modelling. Nevertheless, in case of future migratory movements they cannot be interpreted as prognoses of the future trends but rather as “what-if” type statements. From this perspective, it becomes evident that through popu-

lation projections one may investigate the future expectations of those involved in building hypothesis concerning the future trends. One should add that in case of Szeged, Sfântu Gheorghe, and Maribor hypotheses concerning future migratory trends were built by local experts consulting local level stakeholders. Consequently, through population projections we might take a look on their future expectations concerning migratory movements.

The results show that those municipalities who experienced negative population trends and perceive their own developmental prospects pessimistically expect even worse demographic trends than in the last decades. It is characteristic that Sfântu Gheorghe, Szeged, Kanijža and Szeged cannot "imagine" an influx of migrants.

Figure 11

Results of the population projection in Maribor



In Sfântu Gheorghe immigration has appeared mostly in form a "disaster scenarios" (because – as we will see – demographic nationalism is the most important framework for local stakeholders). The widespread assumption was that "under normal circumstances" the town will not be target of significant waves of immigration, due to the peripheral situation of the locality and its linguistic isolation, respectively:

"There is a limitation due to language knowledge [...] there are problems even with the English language knowledge. Three years ago a language teacher arrived from the Harvard. She was surprised that our students were not interested in language learning. [...] I do not think that with this closed mentality and with this economic situation the region would be "endangered" by immigration, either internal or from abroad. Exactly due to the economic situation, I do not think that this "problem" will evolve." (Expert, local faculty of the Babeș-Bolyai University)

Figure 12

Results of the population projection in Sfântu Gheorghe



Interestingly, in case of Szeged too, the 0 net migration hypothesis was the most optimistic one and all alternative scenarios calculated with a negative net migration, the difference between the zero and the worst migration scenario is around 9000 persons, that is 5.6% of the current population. This is connected to the fact that Serbia and Romania were considered as potential source countries for immigration. However, stakeholders explicitly stated that these two sources have almost been depleted and Szeged cannot expect many persons from these countries in the future. Consequently, institutional actors do not expect an increase in immigration.

Figure 13

Results of the population projection in Szeged



Figure 14

Results of the population projection in Bratislava-Rača



The case of Bratislava-Rača is quite unique. Stakeholders evidently expect in-migration, however many of the in a rather peculiar way. Eventually, two narratives concerning immigration might be distinguished.

According to the first narrative, Slovakia and especially Bratislava with its surroundings has become an economically attractive destination for immigrants. Consequently, the municipality/city receives increasing numbers of foreigners, mainly from the Balkans (Romania and Serbia), Vietnam and the former Soviet Union (Ukraine being the most import source country). The motivation of these migrants will be that employment opportunities in Bratislava are better than in their region of origin. Vietnam was mentioned, as a small community of Vietnamese people already exists in the locality. Some stakeholders also mentioned that due to intensive institutional relations Czech immigrants might also arrive to Bratislava. Some of the stakeholders stressed that immigrants will occupy positions mainly in the secondary labor market.

> *"Still you have certain jobs nobody will do for that money, neither the Englishman nor the Slovak. So there are hard works such on the construction sites. That is why you find there Ukrainians, that is why you find there [workers] from the Balkans. There are jobs our [people] will not do."* (Bratislava- Rača, employment agency)

According to the second narrative, immigrants outside Europe will come. One should emphasize that in Bratislava-Rača when speaking about immigration, the local stakeholders tended to talk about immigrants from outside Europe. Respondents spoke about the immigrants from other countries such as Africa or Asia, although immigrants from Africa and Asia do not make up the large portion of the entire immigrant cohort in Slovakia. In this narrative the main driver of immigration is not economic but political. This is connected to fears that refugees and migrants will be distributed from Western countries to Slovakia.

> *"More developed countries and regions attract more immigrants. But some Western European countries will soon stop accepting more immigrants, so more immigrants mainly from Africa and Asia will come to Slovakia."* (Bratislava-Rača, stakeholder)

"The municipality will receive in the following 15–20 years more immigrants mainly from Africa and Asia because the Western European states such as Germany and France will not receive them anymore" (Bratislava-Rača, stakeholder)

"I think that states such as Germany, France and Italy, Austria not that much, are oversaturated with it and we will meet with those migrants more." (Bratislava-Rača, stakeholder)

"There will be more immigrants, Slovakia is an attractive country and it a safe country without war and conflicts which is also attractive for migrants" (Bratislava-Rača, stakeholder)

"Slovakia and the Bratislava region are not very attractive for immigrant's rights now but we will soon encounter massive immigration from Muslim countries due to the migrant quotas pushed by Brussels" (Bratislava-Rača, stakeholder)

Consequently, the expected in-migration is not perceived as unanimously positive by the Bratislava-Rača stakeholders. Many of them emphasized that the city might face difficulties in integration, migrants might become isolated and encapsulated in their own "parallel societies". Cultural differences were also overemphasized, stressing that this might represent a pressure on "other citizens" disrupting their lives.

In Burgas too, the LSQA reported that there was a broad consensus among the interviewed institutional actors, and in the local community in general, that potential immigrants from less developed countries present a threat rather than opportunity, and their inflow should be strictly limited, if not entirely stopped. These defensive attitudes were fostered by mainstream media and by the government itself, which proudly reports how illegal migration from Turkey is put under control.

These concerns regarding immigration were however phrased in the most plastic and drastic way by a stakeholder in Bratislava-Rača:

"– Is there any chance to experience in migration to your municipality?
– Yes, there is. If we become poor enough the radioactive waste will be stored here. I think that migratory waves also produce their radioactive

waste. I think that we will receive let's say 10,000 euro for a migrant and our political leaders will settle them here. The houses are empty and the migrants will be settled here. This might seem a bit sarcastic and a bit futuristic but it might happen." (School director, Kanjiža)

In some respect, Graz is at the opposite end of this spectrum, also as Austria is representing a mature immigration country, having developed plenty of policies in the last years in order to handle possible negative effects. Graz is the sole city in the project with positive international net migration. According to the high scenario of the population projection, the number of the inhabitants will increase with 120,000 due to positive net migration (meaning an even more significant in migration) and will reach 410,000 inhabitants until 2035. Even according to the low scenario, the increase will be of 40,000. Only in the scenario without migration, Graz would stop to grow. This numbers show that Graz is as a municipality receiving large numbers of immigrants – and stakeholders in the city are also aware that this immigration is needed. Still, also Graz experiences of course outmigration. The positive migration balance is mainly traced back to international migration, while in some years in the past Graz experienced also a negative internal migration balance, mainly due to suburbanization. A positive migration balance therefore also does not mean that no one emigrates, but simply that more people immigrate than emigrate. Also in Graz a number of people leave, e.g. after having finalized their studies. The population development in any case shows that migration is the most important factor of population development today and that Graz would be a declining city without immigration and without a high positive migration balance – just as it is the case in the other cities.

One should also emphasize that perception (and not only statistical "realities") of being and becoming regions of immigration or emigration shape policies aimed to tackle the consequences of migration. While municipalities expecting immigration might focus on establishing institutions facilitating the integration of immigrants, municipalities perceiving themselves as sources of emigration tend to focus on preventing out-migration or facilitating return.

Figure 15

Results of the population projection in Graz



5.3. Positive and negative consequences

As mentioned already, there are several frameworks at the disposal of local stakeholders to conceptualize migration and migration policies. Now we will focus on the perceived developmental consequences of the migration, while different aspects of the "populationist" concerns will be presented in the next subchapter. The most important distinction in the perception of the migration-development nexus might be made between countries/municipalities of emigration and countries/municipalities of immigration. From a developmental point of view, emigration is perceived mostly negatively, while immigration mostly positively by stakeholders.

In the municipalities situated in the labor frontiers (Bulgaria, Romania and Serbia) out-migration was perceived by local stakeholders in rather dramatic terms. This was the most evident in the case of Kanjiža, where next to negative expectations concerning developmental prospects there was an accentuated fear of depopulation.

"A vacuum has evolved during the 1990s. Many from the generation which would be now in its late 40s and early 50s have disappeared. A new vacuum is evolving now and the community won't survive this new shock [of out-migration]. Now we feel that everything is ok. I, as a mayor, feel that everything is ok. There is no unemployment. Of course, nobody has remained here who would be able to work" (Mayor of Kanjiža)

According the school director, the first wave of migration emerged during the 1990 and consequently the most qualified young people disappeared. In the actual wave each strata of the local society is involved:

„… at the beginning, quality was important and not the quantity. These young people probably could have been in leading positions, not all of them, but a big percentage perhaps… this youth did not come back [...] During the last 5 years many have gone in my environment too. No only young people but older ones too, complete families. They went definitively without any desire of returning. Even families living in deep poverty have disappeared." (School director, Kanjiža)

In Sfântu Gheorghe effects of immigration are perceived similarly, however in far less dramatic terms. Few (if any) positive consequences of emigration were emphasized. One should also highlight that "penetration" of different institutional structures of the receiving society were explicitly mentioned among factors causing migration in both cases. Interestingly, in this concept Hungary – otherwise often regarded as "external ethnic homeland" of the minority community (see Brubaker 1996) – was mentioned in both cases.

In Burgas the perception of emigration – importantly the emigration of educated and middle-class background youth – was more ambivalent. One the one hand, institutional actors were genuinely concerned about the emigration of young people, often regarding it as a process of brain drain. They argued that the process represents a major challenge for the local economy, as *"the better educated and motivated are leaving and Bulgarian enterprises have to comply with the second best."* Emigration also causes chronic lack of qualified specialist for the economy, which hinders local development and deteriorates the career options of the remaining young people. This process was referred as a vicious circle by some of our interviewees. This concern was shared by the leaders of the educational establishments in Burgas. They witnessed that

educational migration is on the rise and that after graduating high school the best students go to study in colleges and universities in Europe. Apart from being detrimental for the economy and the local development in general, the emigration of the young is seen as inherently unjust to the Bulgarian society: *"We have always suffered from brain drain. Our education is good, but it subsidizes the economy of the developed countries, where our best students work".*

On the other hand, however, beyond these explicitly phrased concerns, there was an implicit consensus that migration (emigration and especially return migration) as a form of contact with core societies is an important driver of development. This was intimately connected to the diffusionist perception of development discussed in the previous chapter. As already mentioned, many Bulgarians perceive their own "culture" and mentality as being incompatible with development (understood as Westernization), while at the same time they appreciate and adore "Western" culture and mentality. This leads to a self-colonizing mentality and to the conviction that a change of the mentality is needed. Emigrants and returned migrants are largely perceived as agents of this needed mentality change. Metaphorically speaking, development is possible if migrants are successful in "self-colonizing" Bulgaria. In some of the interviews this appeared under the topic of the competition between young returnees and "backward" mentalities characterizing the Bulgarian society:

> *"A friend of mine came from US back to Burgas and created an eco-farm for herbs in one of the nearby villages. The local peasants offered to be her partners, she refused and they let the cattle in her fields. The harvest was ruined so she lost her investment and gave up the idea."* (Burgas)

The acceptance of this diffusionist perspective might be perceived as an aspect sustaining the culture of migration prevalent among middle classes of Burgas. The Burgas LSQA emphasized the existence of such a strong culture of migration connected to educational migration (Alexandrov 2017: 29). From the perspective of the students, the education abroad is an investment in their personal development and a guarantee for successful career. From the perspective of the parents, the support of their offspring to study abroad is

not only pragmatic, however, but also socially driven status choice. In the last decades in Bulgaria, it became almost obligatory to send children to study in Europe or in USA in order to sustain the status of upper middle class. Educational institutions in Burgas play an important role in this process. Teachers and directors see educational migration as a loss for the community; however, they also are attached to diffusionist perspective sustaining culture of migration.

Emigration was perceived in far less dramatic terms in Szeged, Maribor and Bratislava, while it was almost entirely missing in discussions conducted in Graz, where immigration is the dominant narrative.

The rather complex perceptions of immigration were presented previously. Now one should emphasize an additional namely that there is a significant divergence in of the perspectives between different types of institutional actors. In this respect, the position of market actors and large employers and employment agencies should be investigated separately. In their case the utilitarian and economic framework is a very obvious one. In some cases, large employers are directly involved in migratory processes, as they recruit foreign labor force (Bratislava, Graz, Maribor, partially Sfântu Gheorghe). In other cases, they exercise pressure on local or central government to assume the utilitarian perspective and to admit the employment of foreigners in certain sectors. Interestingly, this was the case even in Sfântu Gheorghe, where "populationist" considerations prevailed among stakeholders. As already mentioned there are several large employers in the town engaged in manufacturing who offer relatively lowly paid job. In the last few years they face shortage in labor force and there is a demand for foreign labor force:

> *"We have such cases. Here in Covasna country, the managers of larger manufactories aim to import foreign, non-EU workers. For instance XY factory wanted to import foreign workers. There is such a pressure on us. [...]In such cases we have to notice that there is no native or intra-EU labor force for that jobs and that we have to solicit the employment of foreign labor force. And administratively speaking, this is a quite inconvenient situation for us. Because, in fact, one could offer labor force for that company from the internal labor market too.* (Labor force agency, Sfântu Gheorghe).

5.4. "Populationist" views and forms of demographic nationalism

As mentioned already, different currents of developmental thinking evaluate differently the migration-development nexus. Historical-structuralist approaches tend perceive migration as part of unequal exchanges reproducing territorial inequalities. In the view of developmental idealists and adepts of the neo-classical theories migration might lead to a functional equilibrium and more equal territorial development. In our analysis we are "agnostic" concerning these theoretical debates and perceive these approaches as general frameworks that shape not only scientific debates but public discussions and policies too. Our question was not weather migration has mostly positive or mostly negative consequences in terms of development but how stakeholders perceive these processes and how try to tackle with them. However, our interviews also underscored that next to the Universalist and utilitarian considerations and other framework, namely "populationism" and demographic nationalism is also important in shaping the perceptions of our stakeholders. These "populationist" considerations appear in quite different forms. This subchapter is an account focusing on varying forms of "populationist" concerns and demographic nationalism, which often crosscut Universalist considerations and in some cases might even question the legitimacy of frameworks dealing with migration exclusively from a developmental perspective.

5.4.1. Internal migration and populationist concerns

"Populationist" interpretative frameworks and demographic nationalism were most evidently present in the case of the two minority (Hungarian) majority towns. In these municipalities not only international migration but internal migration too was interpreted in an ethnicist framework, the proportion of different ethnic communities being the most important stake.

In Sfântu Gheorghe stakeholders emphasized the different patterns of internal in- and out-migration of the Romanian and Hungarian communities.

In Kanjiža too, internal migration was mostly perceived through the ethnic lenses and the fear that internal migration might lead to a decline in the share of the Hungarian-speaking population was even more widespread compared with Sfântu Gheorghe:

"The Hungarian community is rather immobile but the Serbs do not care. There is Serbian couple in the town, both are physicians and they cannot speak Hungarian at all. They need continuously somebody who translates for them. But they say that they have never seen such a pretty town in Serbia. They remain here and they will grow old here. As many Hungarians leave so many Serbs come. One might anticipate when Kanjiža will become a Serbian majority town. If economy becomes more prosperous, this will be inevitable." (Mayor of Kanjiža)

This was the case even if immigration to the municipality was minimal according to the interviewees. While the perceptions of in-migrants of Serb ethnicity are ambivalent (and not unilaterally negative), the in-migration of Roma is perceived as a real threat affecting the municipality. According to the stakeholders, those Roma who settle in usually represent a challenge for the community. This was emphasized in case of Martonoš and Horgoš were Roma coming from Kosovo were settled.

In case of Burgas "populationist" concerns related to internal migration were present too; however, not in an explicitly ethnicized way. It was emphasized by many stakeholders that the internal migration of unskilled workers to Burgas is estimated negatively: *"The inflow of people from the rural areas is changing the overall culture of the town. Now it is less urban than it used to be."*

5.4.2. Selective approaches towards immigration

It is well known that national communities have been redefined throughout Eastern Europe following the regime change. The most important and powerful tool of this process was citizenship policy and offering extra-territorial citizenship for ethnic kin. As already mentioned, Serbia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria have rather similar legal practices in this respect. Extra-territorial ethnic citizenship can be analysed and evaluated in multiple frameworks, however, without any doubts population and migration policy is one of these frameworks (Waterbury 2014, Melegh 2016). The link between kinstate policy and demographic recovery is the most obvious in the Bulgarian case. According to the National Strategy on Migration, Asylum and Integration (2011–2020), Bulgaria sought to encourage Bulgarians of origin to resettle permanently in Bulgaria in order help 'overcoming the negative demographic trends' (cited by Dumbrava

2018: 7). In case of Hungary, Serbia and Romania there is no such direct discursive link between offering extra-territorial citizenship and demographic recovery and – at least at a rhetorical level – citizenship legislation is not designed to facilitate residing of ethnic kin community members in these countries. Nevertheless, extra-territorial citizenship provides them with rights which enable them to move freely and to settle down and thus is conductive to an ethnic selectivity of the immigration policies (Melegh 2016: 98).

Among the investigated municipalities Szeged was affected by a significant inflow of transborder ethnic kin. The main immigrant communities in the municipality are the Serbian-born and Romanian-born population: 6000 and 3000 persons, respectively. The locality was described by some of our interviewees as a gate in relation to Romania and Serbia. Importantly, an in spite of the present of a great number of immigrants from Romania and Serbia (most of them of Hungarian ethnicity), immigrants from these Danube Region countries were not mentioned by the interviewees as an important immigrant group in Szeged and were not regarded as immigrants either.

In Burgas the Russian community had in some respect a similar status, as more preferred migrants. Contrary to Serbian- and Romanian-born Hungarians in Szeged, Russian immigrants in Burgas form a diaspora with clearly delineated, but not rigid boundaries. Russians tend to live close to one another (in the so called Russian blocks) situated in Bulgarian majority neighbourhoods. Russians are mostly positively stereotyped by Bulgarians. According to their neighbours, they are nice and polite people with good social position. They are perceived as socially active and entrepreneurial people with considerable financial resources. They are clearly perceived as contributing to the local development, as long as they bring in it considerable resources. The ambivalence of their image was, however, revealed by interview fragments were our interlocutors referred to political tensions between the EU and Russia and to the period of Soviet domination

Another widespread element was that stakeholders hierarchized migrants and they especially put in opposition the Eastern European and Muslim immigrants. A school director in Kanjiža made claims concerning the supposed rule abiding nature of “Europeans” in general which claim then was put into a supposedly existing cultural hierarchy between “Europeans” and “refugees”. Such essentializing language was used to justify the selection among migrants. The securitization of migration was also strongly present.

5.4.3. Selective approach toward emigration

In some cases stakeholders are also selective in their concerns regarding emigration and this might led also to selective migration policies. In many municipalities – in a most accentuated way in Burgas, but in Szeged, Sfântu Gheorghe, Bratislava too – emigration of young educated people was perceived as a form of brain drain. These concerns were mostly phrased in a utilitarian language. In Burgas, for example, the massive and persistent emigration of young and educated Bulgarians towards the developed European countries was perceived as affecting unfavourably. Emigration of these groups was in negative and even catastrophic terms: as a constant brain drain and a pending disaster for the local community.

> *"The better educated and motivated are leaving and Bulgarian enterprises have to comply with the second best."*

However, next to this utilitarian language class based and ethnic selection was also present. While the emigration of young professionals and students, who tend to remain in the host country after graduating, is construed in strictly negative terms, that of unskilled workers and undereducated Roma is perceived as something normal and even desirable.

In the case of Burgas the perceived selectivity of migration (stakeholders believed that overwhelmingly educated people leave the country) is perceived as a threat for the local culture. Due to the continuous drain of the young and educated, it is believed that the city cannot form viable social and cultural elite.

5.4.4. Selective pronatalism

Selective pro-natalism can be considered as a form of demographic engineering. As Melegh (2016) highlighted, it might be considered one of the core elements of the demographic nationalism of Orbán's Hungary. Without entering into details it should be emphasized that selective pro-natalism facilitates the childbearing of certain social categories at the expense of others. Selective pro-natalism represents a merge of pronatalist discourses/policies with Malthusian and neo-Malthusian concerns. Different forms of Malthusianism (problematizing the high fertility of lower classes) and neo-Malthusianism (problematizing the high fertility of "underdeveloped" regions) are anti-natalist discourses.

The ideas are deeply interwoven with the idea of cultural superiority of certain groups and therefore highly problematic from an equality point of view, but still evident in many Eastern European societies. Further, pro-natalist policies are also imagined as policies alternative to immigration, although in liberal democracies pro-natalist policies are only successful if they are able to foster the reconcilability of employment and family.

Selective pro-natalist considerations were evidently present in the interviews conducted in Sfântu Gheorghe. As already mentioned, the mayor of the town defined Sfântu Gheorghe, as the town of middle class families rising up three or more children. These consideration are evidently mixed with anti-natalist ones considering the fertility of Roma population as being too high. During the interviews, a social worker stated that he sees on the one hand increasing numbers of abortion as problematic, on the other hand he states that most children born are born into families where they don't have similar chances to the rest of the population. The perception of abortions as unborn potential can be also perceived as a way of selective pronatalism, since it recognizes that mainly women with a certain background of empowerment are in the position of deciding on their own fertility. Still, the stakeholder does not recognize that the structural circumstances which are leading to the decision of many women to not give birth, are the ones that need to be changed (e.g. financial restraints, incompatibility of career and family) and not the fertility per se.

6. Narratives of young migrants

In this last chapter of our working paper we present some results of the narrative biographic interviews conducted with young migrants. This method of interviewing allows for a wide range of analytical possibilities. One might reconstruct durable dispositions or *habituses* through the biographical stories and it is also possible to outline the self-representation of the interviewees without subordinating their stories to our previously constructed scientific or political narratives. In this paper we will not exhaust all these analytical possibilities but we will focus on two interlinked topics. First, we focus on the relation between the self-representation of young migrants on the one hand and the discursive frameworks used by local stakeholders presented in the previous chapter on the other. Second, we ask how the concepts prevalent in the scientific literature and outlined in the conceptual framework provided by the UNIVIE team (Fassmann-Gruber-Németh 2018) appear in the narratives of the young migrants. We will follow the pathway above. In the first subchapter we present the methodology and the analytical possibilities of the narrative biographical interviews. In the next subchapter we will outline a typology of the narratives provided by young migrants. These types of narratives will be perceived as strategies of self-representation and each of them will be briefly presented. In the last subchapter we will discuss the relation of these strategies of self-representation to the frameworks of stakeholders and the previously outlined concepts.

6.1. Narrative biographical interviews: methodology and analytical possibilities

The narrative biographic method constitutes a relatively strict way of conducting and analyzing interviews. It might be regarded as a non-structured method of interviewing, as opposed to semi-structured and structured methods of data gathering. The method was used in a couple of individual and collective projects,[28] among others to investigate the self-representations of migrants (Kovács-Melegh 2000). Narrative biographical investigation was developed in different disciplines and became widespread in the area of migration studies too. It is regarded as a proper tool to theorize the experiences and strategies of self-representation of different groups of migrants. Thomas and Znaniecki (1918) in their classical work entitled the Polish Peasant in Europe and America used extensively biographical material, however, they regarded it mostly as sociological "raw data" (source of information) instead as narrative representation. Biographical research became quite common in the social sciences of the German-speaking countries. Fritz Schütze (1976), for example, regarded it as an open-ended (non-structured) method of interviewing and interpreting interviews. Martin Kohli (2009), a widely known expert of the biographic research was who regarded biographic narrative as a tool of self-representation. He argued that the importance of biographic narratives is connected to social processes of the late modernity, namely the individualization and the parallel institutionalization of biographic self-representation. He also emphasized that biographical narratives are not (just) an individual product but a social construct and that the major question is how people in different settings (re)produce biographic narrative and what socially prefabricated patterns use in this process. In an era of institutionalized biographic self-representation both personal and group identities might be investigated through biographies. It is also important that biographic research does not conceptualize identity as a toolkit of unchangeable characteristics or unchanged attachment to the same social (ethnic, national, class, gender etc.) categories but as an ability to build and maintain coherence through changing situations and social settings. In other words, the concept of identity utilized by adepts of narrative biographic research is not static and rigid but strategical and changeable.

[28] See Rosenthal (1998), Chamberlayne et al (2002).

Apitzsch and Siouti (2007) emphasized that biographical narratives are at the intersection of conscious efforts to construct and publicly present one's identity on the one hand and unconscious cultural, societal and individual predispositions (habituses) on the other. It is also important that through biographic narratives we might investigate histories of persons who are on the one hand agents of societal processes but on the other hand are also constrained by structural factors and inequalities. If one perceives narrative biographic analysis as the reconstruction of habituses, he or she will be able also able to reconstruct certain societal positions from the perspective of personal experiences. Examples of such kind of reconstruction range from the investigation of Holocaust to that of macro-societal transformations, such as post-Socialism, deindustrialization, neo-liberal modernization, collapse of empires, states etc.

The key element of conducting narrative-biographic interviews is that the interview is divided into three sections. The first section is introduced by a carefully constructed single narrative question, for example *"Please tell me the story of your life, all the events and experiences that have been important to you personally; begin wherever you want to begin, I won't interrupt, I'll just take some notes for afterwards"*. In this phase the interviewer ought not put auxiliary questions or interrupt the interviewee but only supports him/her through non-verbal gestures. This phase of the interview is also called the main narrative and it has a key role in the reconstruction of the self-representation of the interviewee. The second phase is also a narrative one, when the interviewer puts questions based on strictly predefined rules. The questions put in this phase are strictly narrative, no direct questions are allowed in this phase. The question refer only to issues mentioned by the interviewer during the first phase of the interview, strictly in the order they were mentioned and using the phasing of the interviewed person. The third phase is similar to a semi-structured interview. Here additional questions based on the first and second phase are also allowed and prefixed questions (based on a previously elaborated guide) might also be asked.

In our investigation we followed the rules outlined above but through the initial narrative question we aimed to orient our respondents towards their migratory experiences. The initial question was as follow: *"I am engaged in the YOUMIG project. The project focuses on the international migration of young people. In this phase of the project we conduct interviews with young people with migratory experiences."* In the third part of the interview we asked pre-

viously fixed questions referring to the motivations, networks, resources and attitudes of the young migrants.

The narrative biographic analysis has two levels, namely the reconstruction of the lived biography and the reconstruction of the biographic narrative. At the first (biographic) level we reconstruct the life course based on the events revealed during the interview, at the second level we engage in a textual analysis of the interview and perceive it as a narration of past event from the present.

The biographic analysis begins with the selection and chronologic reorganization of the life events. Each data that might be interpreted as an "event" or a social constellation representing the context of the biography should be selected. Here also aim to reconstruct the social, institutional, cultural and generational context which shaped the life experiences of the interviewee. Actually, we focus on the orientations and dispositions orienting the agency of the interviewee and we also aim to outline the possibilities that would be continent with the given social and institutional context but were ignored by the interviewee. When analyzing the life course we do not focus on how the interviewee represents the events but try to elaborate our own narrative. Following Bourdieu (1985) we might perceive this level of the analysis as a habitus reconstruction. According to Bourdieu, habitus is a structure of durable dispositions shaping human agency. Through observing the life events and the choices the interviewees had during their life course we might elaborate plausible hypothesis concerning their durable dispositions. This analytical framework is useful, as the concept of habitus provides a link between the structural and institutional setting and human agency. From this viewpoint the reconstruction of the life-course may be successful only if it is integrated in its historical context. In other words, the plausibility of the reconstruction of the life course is a function of our sociological and socio-historical knowledge.

At a second level, the narrative biographical analysis focuses on the textual structure of the interview and aims to reconstruct the relevance-structures of the interviewee asking how he or she interprets and presents the events. In this phase it is of primal importance that through life story the interviewee not only reports the event but reconstructs and reinterprets them. The narrative construction, however, is not totally unconstrained. According to Hayden White (1987: 3) *"the narrative ceaselessly substitutes meaning with the straightforward copy of the events recounted"* or, in other words, it floats between the lived experience and reconstructed meaning of the events. Through our analysis we focus on the process of reconstruction and reinterpretation of lived (and

not aleatory) experiences. We aim to reconstruct a narrative structure through which not only the events are reconstructed but also the identity of the story teller is publicly presented.

Through the narrative biographical method we do not aim to present social facts that are independent of the relevance structure of the story teller but aim to reconstruct the life story as a social fact. The function of the biographical narrative is not only to reconstruct the events but also to strive for the recognition of the social identity of the story teller. In this sense it is not independent of the relevance structures of the audience. This means that the means that only certain narratives can be successfully communicated. From a sociological perspective the biographical narratives are relevant because they use socially prefabricated narrative panels. In what follows we will focus only to this latter aspect of the narrative biographies and will present a typology of self-representations of young migrants, which is, certainly, not independent of the socially prefabricated narrative panels being at their disposal.

6.2. A typology of migrant narratives

Theoretically, the number of possible biographical narratives is endless. Nevertheless, if one went through a higher number of narrative interviews, he or she would find some typical narratives or typical modes of self-representation. This is not accidental, as the number of life stories that can be communicated with success is limited and this is even more accentuated in case of narrative constructions connected to certain well-defined social categories, such as the category of young migrant (immigrant, emigrant, returned migrant etc.). In case of this category it is quite obvious that the society (meaning the legal institutional system, the discursive order, the public opinion etc.) facilities certain self-representations, while hinders (or even punishes) others. For instance, from the perspective of state authorities, refugee is a legal-administrative category. From our perspective, refugee is a narrative strategy of self-representation; however, the success of being recognized as a refugee has quite severe consequences for the further life chances of the story teller. Generally speaking, it depends on social and cultural context, which narratives can be communicated and made recognized successfully or in other words society prescribes (to a certain extent) how a young migrant should look like. This also means that our interview-

ees might use socially and discursively prefabricated elements in constructing and presenting their life storied as young migrants. One might of course select among these prefabricated narrative patterns and might construct (in some cases in a quite creative ay) his or her own story. This also means that one biography might obviously combine different narrative patterns.

In our project we conducted 61 narrative biographic interviews with young migrants and we identified 12 typical modes of self-representation as migrants. In the majority of the interviews more than one type of narrative was used and the linkages between the types is also interesting. In what follows we will briefly present the types of migrant narratives and then – in the next subchapter – we discuss their relation with the discursive frameworks used by stakeholders.

Table 7

Types of auto-biographical narratives

	Burgas	Kanjiža	Sfântu Gheor-ghe	Bratis-lava	Graz	Szeged	Maribor
Professional self-fulfillment	4					2	2
Adventurer	1	2		1	2	2	
Climbing the East-West slope	3	2	2		3		
Hardships of the ordinary man	1	2		2			
Escaping desperation		3					
Alienation	2	2			2	1	
Difficult integration		1			2		
Political migration					2		
Ethnic migration						2	
Escaping discrimination			2				
The translator	1						
Suburbani-zation				2			2

6.2.1. Professional self-fulfillment

For many interviewees, migration was connected to professional self-fulfillment and narrated their story of migration as a constant and persistent pursuit towards this goal. At the very center of this narrative lies individual professional carrier. This narrative pattern was the most prevalent among educational migrant, especially those in Burgas. Our interviewees using this narrative strategy argued that graduating abroad provides them with better work opportunities and opens broader possibilities. Educational migration toward Western Europe constitutes certainly a great financial investment from the part of the parents. As the Bulgarian LSQA (Alexandrov 2017) pointed out, in upper middle classes support for their offspring is not just pragmatic. In Bulgaria middle class status can be reproduced through sending children to study at Western universities. Nevertheless, in the center of this narration are neither family efforts nor status reproduction but the self-fulfilling young individual.

6.2.2. The adventurer

The second most frequent type of narrative strategy was that of adventurer. At the center of these narratives is also a self-fulfilling individual, however, is not the professional carrier but the freedom of choice. Interviewees using this strategy depict migration as a sequence of experiences where they learn about different cultures, meet people. An important element is that through migration they avoid to be integrated in the institutionalized and formalized world of the adulthood and in this sense they postpone the end of their post-adolescent life period. Labor market, establishing a family appear as depressive and traumatic which should be avoided as far as it is possible. In this narrative the young generation with its institutionally open future and the old generation equated with institutional constrains are put in opposition. For those who use this strategy the freedom without commitments seems to be desirable and takes priority over the security and predictability of a “settled life”. In many interviews it was used the expression of “being incorporated into the system” and through this they meant primarily economic subordination.

6.2.3. Climbing the East-West slope

The vast majority of migrant narratives were structured, explicitly or implicitly, around the comparison between sending and receiving countries and in all these comparisons development has played a pivotal these comparisons. In many narratives migration was presented as a move from less developed toward more developed places. The narratives referred to quite different aspects in this respect. In many cases the ratio of income and costs of living was mentioned, meaning that migration was presented (in accordance to rational choice and push-pull models) as an outcome of cost-benefit calculations. An even more frequent problematic was that of organized and systemic characteristics of the Western European societies, mentioned earlier. Many interviewees referred to the economic organization and culture of the "West" as unanimously appreciated and perceived as superior.

In Bulgarian and Serbian interviews an interesting pattern emerged (Alexandrov 2017; Ágyas-Szárcsevity 2017). On the one hand, the economic organization and the material culture of the West European countries were unanimously appreciated as superior. The security and predictability of the organized western societies is seen as a major advantage. On the other hand however, these characteristics are experienced as confining limitations.

6.2.4. Hardships of the ordinary man

One should emphasize that this mode of self-representation is typical for lower educated interviewees, mostly with working class background and in fact it is in opposition with the narrative strategies presented above. All in all, this social stratum was highly underrepresented among our interviewees, as local experts tended to select higher educated young people with middle class background (except Kanjiža and Sfântu Gheorghe). Nevertheless, this strategy of self-representation might be found among our interviewees in Burgas, Kanjiža, Bratislava and Sfântu Gheorghe. The main topics in these interviews are the work opportunities and interviewees present them often in a comparative manner (presenting the work opportunities in countries of destination and origin). As for the countries of origin, diminishing working opportunities and deindustrialization are emphasized. In case of working experiences in receiving countries,

mostly the hardships and the bad conditions of the secondary labor market are highlighted.

Unlike a typical middle class background youngster, narrators using this strategy present themselves as constrained by structural factors, macro-events and other circumstances. They also present themselves are member of certain groups, such as the working class, ordinary people. The role of family or the larger environment (villagers etc.) is also emphasized and in many cases migration is presented as shaped by collective rather than individual decisions.

> *"I went to Spain because there was no work in Bulgaria... We were 12 people from a small town, most of us relatives. My father went first, he found this job and put us in touch with the employers. The employers organized everything. They helped us find proper accommodation, they provided us with regular job. We stayed two years and a half there. The work was hard but well paid and I worked with pleasure. At first it was fine, but then I realized that I like Bulgaria more and want to return. My father and my brother preferred to stay, they are still there."*
> (Young returnee, Burgas)

6.2.5. Escaping desperation

This type of narrative self-representation was present only among emigrants from Kanjiža. They put emphasizes on push factors, describing their sending environment as a rather depressive place where no "normal" life might be conducted. The narrative focuses on primarily on economic decline of the town and the country and it is often intertwined with the Yugo-nostalgia, presented earlier.

> *"We were able to afford spending that mark a normal life. For instance, everyone should afford to go to holyday once a year with his/her family, with the kinds. It is normal to travel, to recreate, to take a vacation and to go somewhere. This was hard to do until we left Serbia and this was why we ultimately decided to leave. We thought that our situation should be changed ... Such things, to go holiday for instance or to buy something you need were taken for granted in olden times, when I was a child. My father worked, while my mother was at home with us. But we had*

everything. And then came the war and came the troubles and the bombings. There was no electricity for instance but we survived. But it became harder. My father had a lot to work to support us and after all my mother was also pushed to go to work. My father always said that these were hard times but it would be better. And ultimately, it would not become better ..." (young emigrant from Kanjiža to Germany).

6.2.6. Difficult integration

In some of the interviews the biographic narrative was constructed around the difficulties of the integration. One should emphasize that the context in which the interviews were made also matters. In our sole receiving locality, namely Graz, the integration of migrants is at the public agenda. Consequently, when they were asked to narrate their migrant biography they were likely to focus on this aspect. The Graz LSQA (Rath et al. 2017) emphasized that many young migrants phrased that they feel not belonging to the receiving society:

„ … when you go to the discotheque you get this feeling of separation, either you belong to the local people or to the [group of foreigners], then you can feel the separation,… and when there is a racist security guy at the entrance, who doesn't let you in because you have black hair, then you become stubborn and you automatically are against them, you against us, we against you, and this is a bit of a problem, separation is there again …" (young immigrant to Graz)

"It is really hard when you have to decide where to belong to, here or there?" (young immigrant to Graz)

The topic of integration was intimately linked to the question of identity and in-betweenness.

6.2.7. Political migration

Two of our interviewees in Graz, namely from Turkey and Hungary, presented themselves as "political migrants". Certainly, they were not asylum seekers

and their move had also other motivations. However, the discourses concerning Erdogan's Turkey and Orbán's Hungary as authoritarian or hybrid regimes encouraged them to mention problems caused by the political situation in the country of origin as motives for migrating. According to this interviews the prevailing political situation that does not allow future perspectives from the individual point of view, can lead to emigration, which especially holds true for young people. At the interface of politics and economy two interview partners also mention corruption as a topic.

6.2.8. Ethnic migration

Ethnic migration as a strategy of self-representation was used by two Serbian-born Hungarians living currently in Szeged. They argued that the main motivation of moving toward Hungary was that they wanted to move toward a linguistically and culturally more Hungarian environment. Both interviewees come from area where Hungarians live dispersed and constitute a minority even at a local level. However, in Serbia they were integrated in an institutionally sustained "Hungarian world" and their mobility was linked to this environment. For them Hungary and Szeged seemed a logical option. One should also emphasized that in Hungary this narrative (e.g. representing themselves as ethnic migrants) is facilitated.

6.2.9. Escaping discrimination

Being forced to migrate by discrimination was the dominant strategy of self-representation of the interviewed young Roma in Sfântu Gheorghe. They emphasized first and foremost the discrimination at the labor market and that they cannot find jobs due to their Roma origin and this is why they should migrate. In many respects this narrative resembles that of the "ordinary man" who is pushed by the structural constrains to work abroad.

7. Concluding remarks

7.1. Demographic processes in a hierarchic space

In the first part of our WP we presented population and migratory processes at the level of our seven municipalities. In this enterprise we relied on the local case studies (LSQAs) carried out by our colleagues employed by the local municipalities. As already mentioned, LSQAs combined quantitative and qualitative methods and thus provided a meaningful local level insight on migratory processes. To carry out a meaningful comparison we located the investigated municipalities according to both their position in the internal settlement hierarchy and the country's position in (East-West-type European or Danube region) migratory system. By doing this, it becomes evident that population processes are not homogenous inside countries belonging to different developmental tiers. One should also emphasize that in the core countries territorial disparities in both immigration and internal migration might be huge. There is a tendency of concentration of both immigrants and internal migrant in large urban centers and their metropolitan zones, while several territories might face depopulation in the core countries too. In case of "labor frontiers" depopulation might be a more general phenomenon affecting the country as a whole. However, disparities are significant in this case too: smaller towns and less developed territories might face real emptying, while in case of national level growth poles the demographic evolution might be more balanced.

Table 8 summarizes the demographic evolution of the investigated municipalities by overall population growth at municipality level and the position of the country in the migratory system. To anticipate some results, Kanjiža and Sfântu Gheorghe are examples of small towns in labor frontier countries that

might face depopulation. Maribor, as a former industrial center and an internal periphery of the restructuring semi-core (which was unable to regress) also faces population decrease. In Burgas and Szeged the decrease was slight, as both cities were affected by both in- and out-migration. Rača, as a residential area of the Slovak capital and Graz produced population growth. In case of Rača this was due mostly to internal migration, while Graz has really become a multicultural environment.

Table 8

Demographic processes by the position of the county in the migratory system and dynamics of population growth at municipality level

		Demographic processes at municipality level		
		Decrease	***Stagnation***	***Growth***
Position of the country in migration system	Labor frontier (countries of emigration)	Kanjiža, Sfântu Gheorghe	Burgas	
	Semi-core (immigration and emigration)	Maribor	Szeged	Bratislava-Rača
	Core (countries of immigration)			Graz

7.2. Perceptions of developmental prospects: acceptance of DI and forms of criticism

In the next broad part of the working paper we focused on the perceptions of stakeholders and migrants. One of our main questions was how stakeholders perceive development and the development-migration nexus. Based on these results one might emphasize that developmental thinking proved to be rather important to our interviewees. They had a quite sophisticated sense of detecting developmental differences and developmental hierarchies shaped profoundly their self-understanding. For them, as for stakeholders, improving the developmental position of their municipalities was an important (one might say

that the most important goal). However, they did not accept all elements of developmental idealism and consequently, they criticized several aspects of the dominant ideology and cultural framework backing the institutional structures of the European Union.

It seemed that the acceptance of developmental idealism was less problematic in case of actors who positioned themselves at the top of the hierarchy. In Graz DI seemed to be accepted. Our interviewees considered that their country and their municipality is at the top of the developmental hierarchy (not that it was not adequately investigated). Their developmental story was mainly about continuous development since 1945 and practically no critical discourses can be identified concerning the dominant framework of developmental idealism. In the next chapter, we will discuss however, that some actors construct the culture backing the functioning of the modern societies in a rather essentialist way and consider that some groups of immigrants own cultural stuff incompatible with development. In Bratislava-Rača developmental idealism is also less problematic. Our interviewees put Slovakia at a middle position on the developmental hierarchy and on the top inside Slovakia. This position seemed convenient for them mainly because they were basically satisfied with the developmental pathway of their own country and municipality and optimistic regarding future progress. For them catching up and joining the core seemed to be possible. Development meant first of all an infrastructural process and institutional design, while contacts with core and transnational institutions were evaluated positively.

In all other locations (having a less advantageous position) developmental idealism seemed to be more problematic. In Kanjiža and Maribor the developmental expectations were actually rather negative and this was completed by a strong sense of Yugo-nostalgia in the Serbian town. In Burgas stakeholders embraced DI but basically considered that their own culture hinders development. In Sfântu Gheorghe a relatively well elaborated localist and anti-globalist discourse seemed to prevail.

7.3. Stakeholder frameworks and narratives of young migrants

As for the discursive frameworks in which stakeholders conceptualize migration, one can distinguish between two radically different ways of thinking

about migratory processes. The first one can be labelled as “utilitarian framework”, while the second one as “demographic nationalism”. The “utilitarian” thinking can be characterized as pragmatic framework. It borrows the language of economics. According to it migrants are needed because of labor force demand. (At least theoretically) this framework is neutral concerning the cultural background of the migrants. Demographic nationalism is an alternative framework that was also often used by stakeholders and which in several contexts might be at odds with developmental thinking, as according to it the major goal is not the well-being of the locality but the reproduction of the ethno-national community.

If one compares the frameworks of the stakeholders and the narratives used by young migrants several challenges will arise both concerning the utilitarian framework and demographic nationalism. First, young migrants from Danube region often reject the utilitarian framework and for many of them cultural background seems to be central. One might argue that there is a welfare and labor market competition among different categories of migrants. In this framework for Eastern Europeans a concept of “We”, meaning Europeans is of central importance.

In sending localities stakeholders perceive large scale emigration with concern. From the *“populationist”* perspective of demographic nationalism large scale emigration of co-nationals endangers the reproduction of the ethno-nation. From a more utilitarian perspective “brain drain”, or the emigration of young and educated people is regarded a major challenge affecting negatively labor market processes and future development. For the young migrants however, migration represents a normal development and many of them embrace a more cosmopolitan identity in which moving in the European space is normal part of the life trajectory.

Annexes – Local Status Quo Analyses in 7 municipalities

Local Status Quo Analyses might be found at YOUMIG Webpage: http://www.interreg-danube.eu/approved-projects/youmig

Annex 1

Authors and titles of LSQAs

Municipality	Author(s)	Title
Bratislava-Rača	**Institute of Informatics and Statistics:** Branislav Bleha, Ján Buček, Branislav Šprocha, Slavomír Ondoš, Boris Vaňo **The Slovak Governance Institute:** Lucia Kováčová **Municipality of the city district Bratislava-Rača:** Danuša Jurčová, Eva Miklánková	YOUMIG Transnational Youth Migration in the Municipality of the city district of Bratislava - Rača: processes, effects and policy challenges
Burgas	Haralan Alexandrov	YOUMIG Transnational Youth Migration in the Municipality of the city district of Burgas: processes, effects and policy challenges
Graz	**City of Graz:** Otto Rath, Priska Pschaid **University of Vienna:** Elisabeth Gruber, Adam Nemeth	YOUMIG Transnational Youth Migration in Graz: processes, effects and policy challenges

Municipality	Author(s)	Title
Kanjiža	Réka Ágyas Bea Sárcsevity	YOUMIG Transnational Youth Migration in Kanjiža: processes, effects and policy challenges
Maribor	**SLOGA Platform:** Adriana Aralica, Albin Keuc **Maribor Development Agency:** Borut Jurišić, Amna Potočnik **Institute for Economic Research:** Nada Stropnik, Nataša Kump	YOUMIG Transnational Youth Migration in Maribor: processes, effects and policy challenges
Sfântu Gheorghe	Andrea Sólyom	YOUMIG Transnational Youth Migration in Sfântu Gheorghe: processes, effects and policy challenges
Szeged	Municipality of Szeged	YOUMIG Transnational Youth Migration in Szeged: processes, effects and policy challenges

Annex 2

Interviews with institutional actors

Municipality	Institution	Function
Bratislava-Rača	1. Municipal Office 2. NGO working with children and youth 3. Local Labor Office 4. NGO providing family care services 5. Local Labor Office 6. Municipal Office 7. Municipal Office 8. Real estate company 9. Union of Seniors	1. Social worker 2. Project manager 3. Director 4. Social worker 5. Head of the Internal Administration Office 6. Head of the Educational Office 7. Real estate agent 8. Representative of the local branch 9. President
Burgas	1. Municipality of Burgas 2. Municipality of Burgas 3. Educational and Demographic Office 4. NGO dealing with domestic violence 5. Free University of Burgas 6. Labor Office 7. Language school 8. Students exchange office 9. Local council of Burgas	1. Deputy mayor 1 2. Deputy mayor 2 3. Referee 4. Director 5. Deputy rector 6. Director 7. Director 8. Director 9. Member
Graz	1. University of Technology Graz, 2. Saubermacher (Company), 3. Employment Service 4. Department of Integration 5. Department of Statistics 6. ISOP - Innovative Social Projects 7. Austrian Freedom Party, 8. Council of Social Affairs and Health	1. Head of Human Resources 2. Head of Human Resources 3. Integration Expert 4. Head of Department 5. Head of Department 6. CEO 7. Head of the City Council Club 8. Office Manager
Kanjiža	1. Municipality of Kanjiža 2. Local school 3. Social Office 4. Youth Office 5. Local firm 6. Local firm 7. Local firm 8. Local community of Kanjiža	1. Mayor 2. School director 3. Field worker 4. Director 5. Entrepreneur 6. Entrepreneur 7. Entrepreneur 8. Former president

Municipality	Institution	Function
Maribor	1. Municipality of Maribor 2. Office of Culture and Youth 3. Office for Migration 4. Employment Service of Slovenia 5. Health Insurance Institute of Slovenia 6. Social Work Centre 7. Ministry of Labor, Family, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities 8. Ministry of Interior 9. Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia 10. Federation of Cultural Associations Maribor 11. Slovene Emigrant Association 12. Association Odnos – NGO working on refugee integration 13. NGO working on refugee integration 14. Private tertiary education institution 15. Career Centers of the University of Maribor 16. A company for sending workers abroad	1. Mayor 2. Director 3. Director 4. Employee 5. Employee 6. Employee 7. Employee 8. Employee 9. Employee 10. President 11. President 12. Manager 13. Executive director 14. Employee 15. Director 16. Manager
Sfântu Gheorghe	1. Local Labour Office 2. Babes-Bolyai University 3. Municipality of Sfântu Gheorghe 4. Mikó Imre High School 5. Community Assistance Office 6. Jobs agency 7. Néri Szent Fülöp School	1. Director 2. Director of local branch 3. Mayor 4. Director 5. Director 6. Manager 7. Director
Szeged	1. University of Szeged 2. Civil organization 3. EURES 4. Employment Division of the local Government Office 5. Municipality of Szeged 6. Company providing HR services 7. Civil organization 8. Social care institution	1. International Marketing Officer 2. Founder member 3. Local adviser 4. Administrator 5. Vice mayor 6. Office manager 7. Chief executive 8. Representative

Annex 3

Interviews with young migrants

Variable	Category	Brtislava-Rača	Burgas	Graz	Maribor	Kanjiža	Sfantu Gheorghe	Szeged
Gender	Male	4	5	5	8	3	7	5
	Female	5	4	4	6	7	3	4
Educational attainment	Primary education	1	0	-	0	0	2	0
	Secondary education	4	1	-	6	4	5	3
	Tertiary education	4	8	-	8	6	3	6
Family status	With children	4	3	-	5	6	4	4
	Without children	5	6	-	9	4	6	5
Type of migration	Returning migrant	3	6	0	1	2	2	3
	Short term migrant		1	0	1	0	4	0
	Commuter	2	0	0	1	4	0	0
	Emigrant		2	0	3	4	4	2
	Immigrant	4	0	8	8	0	0	4

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